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COORDINATING CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY: HOW
TERRITORIALISM SAVES UNIVERSALISM
EdwardS. Adams*
Jason K. Fincke**
This article explores the difficulties of coordinating cross-border
bankruptcies. These difficulties arisefrom the lack of a binding set
of uniform internationalrules, forcing multinationalbusinesses to
look to domestic laws for guidance. The problem is that without
coordinated, concurrent insolvency proceedings, an effective
reorganization qf a multinational corporation is impossible
because a multitude of separatejudgments ultimately leads to the
dismemberment of a debtor's estate.
To address this challenge, an increasing number of countriesincluding the United States and several European countries such
as Germany, Poland,Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdomhave enacted a Model Law on cross-border insolvency. This legal
development has awoken the debate between territorialism and
universalism with new fervor. Traditionally,territorialism allows
the bankruptcy court of a particularjurisdiction to apply its laws
,for the benefit of its jurisdictionalcreditors, whereas universalism
requires all involved jurisdictions to relinquish their sovereignty
and apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction. The Model Law is
based on a modified universalist concept with significant
territorialistelements. It envisions that one court will coordinate
the insolvency proceedings of a multinationalenterprise,no matter
where its assets and creditors arefound.
Thus far, the debate between territorialism and universalism has
focused on the respective strengths and weaknesses of each
system, and the Model Law has been laudedfor its universalist
strengths and condemnedfor its allegedfailure to protect domestic
creditors. However, this Article argues that the Model Law's
combination of territorialistand universalistfeatures will make it
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successful in achieving its goals of efficiency, cost savings, and
predictability. More specifically, this Article suggests that the
Model Law's territorialist aspects, rather than its universalist
aspects, will protect the interests of domestic creditors and other
stakeholders. Finally, the Article concludes that the United States'
enactment of the Model Law is a major step toward international
cooperationfor the United States and that domestic businesses will
only be advantaged by this new cooperative approach.
1.

IN TRO D UCTIO N .............................................................................................. 45

II.

THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW:

UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALISM ........................................................

47

A . U niversalism ....................................................................................
1. Pure U niversalism .......................................................................
2. Modified Universalism .............................................................
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Universalism ...................................
1. N ational Sovereignty .................................................................
2. Discrimination Against Lesser-Developed Countries .............
3. Determination of the Home Country of Corporate Groups ..........
4. Modified Universalism's Disadvantages ...................................
C . T erritorialism ....................................................................................
1. Cooperative Territorialism ........................................................
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Territorialism ....................
a. A dvantages .........................................................................
b. D isadvantages ....................................................................

III.

THE

A.
B.
C.

IV.
V.

VI.

THE EU REGULATION: MODIFIED UNIVERSALISM WITH EMPHASIS ON
U NIVERSA LISM ............................................................................................ 63
SUBSEQUENT SECONDARY CASES ............................................................... 64
THE MODEL LAW: WHERE UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALISM
O V ERLA P ....................................................................................................... 66

A.
B.

V II.

48
49
50
52
53
54
54
55
55
56
57
57
58
MODEL LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION ................... 59
Common Features of the Model Law and European Union
Regu lation .......................................................................................
. . 60
The UNCITRAL Model Law: Modified Universalism with a
Territorialist Foundation ..................................................................
61
Process ...............................................................
.. 63

THE

A.

B.

Secondary Cases under the Model Law: Territorialism's
A dvantages .....................................................................................
. . 67
Judicial Cooperation: Universalism's Advantages .........................
69
1. The M odelLaw ...........................................................................
69
2. Cooperative Territorialism ........................................................
70
3. International Judicial Cooperation in General .........................
71
U .S. EXPERIENCE ................................................................................ 72
The Former Section 304 ..................................................................
72
1. P ro cess ............................................................
..7 3
2. W hy It D idn't W ork ..................................................................
74
The N ew Chapter 15 .........................................................................
75
1. S cop e .............................................................
..7 5

2008]

VIII.
IX.

X.

COORDINATING CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY

2. Venue Choices Under Chapter 15 .........................................
76
3. Procedure and R elief ..................................................
76
4. Recognition of Foreign Proceeding and Relief .......................
77
5. Substantive Relief ....................................................
78
6. Cooperation with Foreign Courts .........................................
80
7. Concurrent Proceedings ................................................
80
INTERNATIONAL VENUE SHOPPING ...............................................
81
ADDRESSING THE DEFECTS OF THE MODEL LAW ......................................
82
A. Timing of the Decision on Whether a Case is the Main Case ............
82
B . Corporate G roups .......................................................
83
C . Residency Rule .........................................................
84

C O N CLUSIO N .......................................................................
85

I.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently the international community has been unable to effectively
coordinate cross-border insolvencies. 1 Without coordinated, concurrent insolvency
proceedings, an effective reorganization of a multinational corporation is impossible
because separate, multiple judgments lead to the dismemberment of a debtor's
estate.2 The lack of a binding set of uniform international rules is a major factor
contributing to the insufficiency of guidelines in cases of cross-border insolvency.3
Furthermore, regional and bilateral agreements have, until now, lacked the
cooperation of Member States or the necessary scope and thus have fallen short of
their intended purpose. 4
The lack of an international insolvency framework forces multinational
businesses to look at domestic laws for guidance. 5 However, domestic insolvency
laws significantly differ from each other by either being debtor- or creditor-oriented. 6
As Ian Fletcher, Professor at the University College of London, notes, the
substantive differences in domestic insolvency laws have precluded the development
of a uniform approach to multinational default. "The ensuing diversity [of domestic
European laws] has been unusually intense, even by the standards of private
international law, with the result that the quest for unifying principles has so far

I SAMUEL L. BUFFORD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 1 (Federal Judicial Center 2001),
available at hftp://www.fjc.gov /public/pdfnsf/lookup/Intllnso.pdf/$file/Intllnso.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2008) ("One of the most noteworthy features of international bankruptcy law is the lack of legal
structures, either formal or informal, to deal with an insolvency that crosses national borders").
2

See id. (discussing various attempts at a universality approach to transnational insolvency

issues).
See generally David H. Culmer, The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat and Customary
International Law: Is ItRipe Yet?, 14 CONN. INT'L L.J. 564, 575 (1999).
1 See Timothy E. Powers et al., The Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act, in
CURRENT ISSUES IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY AND REORGANIZATIONS 233, 234 35 (E. Bruce
Leonard & Christopher W. Besant eds., 1994); see also IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (P.B. Carter ed., 1999) [hereinafter FLETCHER, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW].
5
See Ian F. Fletcher & Hamish Anderson, The Insolvency Issues, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY
AND INSOLVENCY 257, 262 (Michael Bridge & Robert Stevens eds., 2001).
6 See FLETCHER, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 4, at 4-5.
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proved to be elusive."' The reconciliation of domestic insolvency laws is made more
difficult because a country's approach to insolvency is often rooted in that country's
particular societal values and public policies.8 Thus, domestic courts in many
countries, including the United States, are hesitant to defer jurisdiction to the court
of another country that has a completely adverse set of guidelines in place. 9
This hesitancy was cast aside in the United States with the recent passage of The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. One of the
lesser-known provisions of the Act was the adoption of the UNCITRAL 10 Model
Law on Cross Border Insolvency in title VIII of the Act. The Model Law goes
further than the former section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in requiring U.S.
bankruptcy judges to take legal cognizance of foreign insolvency proceedings. The
adoption of the Model puts the United States in the company of Eritrea, Mexico,
Japan, and South Africa (2000); Montenegro (2002); Poland and Romania (2003);
Serbia (2004); the British Virgin Islands and Canada (with amendments) (2005); and
the United Kingdom (2006).11 Germany and Spain have adopted the Model Law in
part. 12 The Model
Law is pending adoption in New Zealand and has been introduced
13
in Australia.
These developments have awoken the territorialism/universalism debate with
new fervor. The Model Law is a modified universalist concept with significant
territorialist elements, and envisions that one court will coordinate the insolvency
proceedings of a multinational enterprise, no matter where its assets and creditors are
found. Territorialists support the current majority system of domestic court
jurisdiction over domestic assets and creditors with coordination done on an ad hoc
basis.
Thus far the universalist/territorialist debate has focused on the respective
weaknesses and strengths of each system, and the Model Law has been lauded for its
universalist strengths and condemned for its alleged failure to protect domestic
creditors. However, this article will argue that it is the combination of the
7

Id.at 10.

8

CARL FELSENFELD, FELSENFELD ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 1 9 (2003); see BUFFORD,

supra note 1, at 3 ("The legal rules governing insolvency law and practice are rooted deeply in the legal
traditions of individual countries. In part this arises because insolvency law preempts and supersedes
many rules of both substantive and procedural law. Moreover, the importance of national economic
interests varies from country to country ....
").
Under former section 304(c) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a U.S. bankruptcy court
might recognize a foreign proceeding if that proceeding is substantially in accordance with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. See NEIL COOPER & REBECCA JARVIS, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CROSS-

BORDER INSOLVENCY 128 29 (1996).
'"
UNCITRAL is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law established by the

General Assembly to further the progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law.
"1
UNCITRAL, Status: 1997 Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral texts/insolvency/1997Modelstatus.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2008) UNCITRAL,

Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency (May 30, 1997), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Model Lair]; see also Samuel L.
Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are Coining: A Reply to ProfessorLoPucki, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 105,

108 (2005) [hereinafter Bufford, Global Venue Controls].
12 See Chris Farley, An Overview, Survey, and Critique of Administering Cross-Border
Insolvencies, 27 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 181, 216 (2004).
'1
E.Bruce Leonard, The InternationalYear in Review, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 78 (2003).
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territorialist and universalist aspects that will make the Model Law successful in
achieving its goals of efficiency, cost savings, and predictability. More specifically,
its territorialist aspects, not its universalist aspects, will protect the interests of
domestic creditors and other stakeholders. Furthermore, the universalist
requirements of information-sharing and administrative coordination are far superior
to a territorialist ad hoc, treaty-based approach.
In short, while chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not placate
territorialist sensibilities, U.S. courts still retain broad control over domestic
concerns through their power to recognize foreign cases and through their power to
refuse enforcement of foreign decisions on the grounds of public policy. The most
important universalist aspect of chapter 15 and the Model Law is the expectation that
U.S. courts will coordinate with foreign bodies. As the Model Law is far from global
adoption, the United States is leading by example. In joining some of its major
trading partners in adopting the Model Law, the United States has sent a powerful
message as to its preference for an international system governing cross-border
insolvencies and as to what rights and privileges it demands for its own domestic
enterprises.
II.

THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
LAW: UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALISM

In the absence of a substantive international insolvency law framework, the
focus of international bankruptcy jurisprudence has long been on the choice of
forum. 14 The choice of forum and the choice of law are intertwined in the area of
international insolvency because no court will conduct bankruptcy proceedings
pursuant to the laws of another jurisdiction. 15 Whether a jurisdiction follows a
particular principle determines whether a cross-border insolvency will be
administered in a single forum or in multiple fora. Thus, the principles of
international insolvency law are not only outcome-determinative as to forum
selection, but they are outcome-determinative regarding the selection of the
substantive law governing the insolvency proceedings.
Two main theories suggest how cross-border insolvency proceedings should be
structured: universalism and territorialism. 6 The historical approach has been
territorialism, where "the courts in each national jurisdiction seize the property
physically within their control and distribute it according to local rules."1

I1 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking InternationalInsolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice of
Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 23, 30 (2000).
t5

Id.

16

Bufford, Global Venue Controls, supra note 11, at 108. In addition to the two theories here,

there are other lesser-known theories of international insolvency, most notably contractualism. See Robert
K. Rasmussen, Resolving TransnationalInsolvencies Through Private Ordering,98 MICH. L. REV. 2252,
2254 55 (2000) (arguing that bankruptcy selection clauses can perform better from economic and
political perspectives than can either universalism or territorialism).
17 Andrew T.Guzman, InternationalBankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2177, 2179 (2000) [hereinafter Guzman, Defense of Universalism] (quoting Jay Lawrence Westbrook,

Choice of Avoidance Lau, in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 513 (1991) [hereinafter
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law]).
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In contrast, universalism in its pure form takes the view that all bankruptcy
assets and claims should be resolved in the debtor's home country under the laws of
that country. 8 Modified universalism provides that a non-home country court may
open a secondary insolvency case to supplement the home-country dominant case for
a debtor. 19 In the absence of a secondary case, modified universalism subscribes to
the pure universalist view that the entire insolvency case should be administered
under the local law of the home country.
Universalism has employed the use of specialized terminology to describe its
cooperative approach. The dominant case in the home country is called the "main"
case or proceeding. 20 A case in any other country is called a "secondary ' 21 or "nonmain ' ,22 case or proceeding. Territorialism does not require such specialized
terminology because every case filed in a separate country is its own main case.
A.

Universalism

Universalism refers to a multinational insolvency system in which a single
court, that of the debtor's home country, has jurisdiction over a debtor's assets,
wherever located, and distributes them in accordance with the law of that country.
The pure form of universalism advocates an idealistic world where courts and legal
systems are bound to enforce the orders of the court of the home country; out of
respect for international comity, they do so. Most advocates of universalism do not
advance the pure form of universalism because of the practical recognition of the
enduring differences among political and economic systems, legal regimes, and court
systems, as well as among enforcement of those regimes. 23 The universalist model
envisions that local courts in each affected country will be obligated by domestic law
(including principles of international comity) or international convention to enforce
the orders of the home country court.24 Thus, universalism is not a single-court
system, but a dominant-court system.25
The modified version of universalism provides a regime that recognizes that
transnational insolvencies involve a complex interaction of national laws and expects
international comity. Under this system, local courts have a degree of freedom as to

t8

Id.

I9

Modified universalism is the form of universalism that most defenders of universalism follow.

See Bufford, Global Venue Controls, supra note 11, at 108, 109 n.22; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Casefor Cooperative Territoriality,98 MICH L. REV. 2216, 2221 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Case].
211 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1502(4) (2005) and Model Law, supra note 11, art. 2(b) (defining "foreign
main proceeding"); Council Regulation 1346/2000, art. 3.4, 2000 O.J. (L 160) (authorizing the opening of
a secondary proceeding before a main proceeding in certain circumstances).
21 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, art. 3.3.
22 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1502(5) (2005); Model Lair, supra note 11, art. 2(c).
23 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities,33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27, 28 n.4 (1998) ("There
is also the notion of 'unity,' which means that one court administers all assets, but that notion is so far
from contemporary reality that it is not really part of the working hypothesis of present scholars."). But
see Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 787, 788 (2000) (arguing for the adoption of pure universalism as the structure
of an international insolvency system) [hereinafter Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism].
24 Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in InternationalBankruptcy: A Post-UniversalistApproach, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 696, 699 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation].
25 LoPucki, Case, supra note 19, at 2221.
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whether compliance with home-country requests is appropriate. The most common
legal standards to determine appropriateness are that compliance does not alter the
legal entitlements of parties and that compliance does not offend the complying
country's public policy.
1.

Pure Universalism

Pure universalism envisions a single insolvency regime that reflects a global
economic structure and that governs all international insolvency cases. Under such a
regime, there would be, for each business entity, one main insolvency case that
would administer all of the entity's assets worldwide. 26 That forum would manage
the case, collect the assets, regulate a reorganization, and provide for the payment of
creditors all around the world.2 Similarly situated creditors in all countries would be
treated equally.28 The case would be governed by a single legal regime governing the
substantive rights of the parties in interest, which would eliminate conflicts among
applicable laws that could vary the rights of either the creditors or the debtor and its
owners. 29 A unified set of procedural rules would also govern the case and would
provide clear guidelines for its commencement or opening, its administration, and its
closing.
The case for pure universalism is easy to state in economic terms.30 The
minimization or elimination of transaction costs produces the most efficient
economic transactions that create the greatest economic value.31 Bankruptcy systems
are designed to reduce transaction costs, specifically debt collection costs, through
collective action.32 However, multiple bankruptcy cases tend to defeat the benefits of
collective action by multiplying the costs of participation and administration.33 Thus,
where a single main insolvency case can be entrusted to protect creditors, to
reorganize or to liquidate business, to protect jobs, and to provide for an orderly and
economical administration of the case, economic efficiencies are created.
Furthermore, such a system "decrease[s] lending costs and do[es] not skew
investment choices. 34 In addition, by reducing the incentive for each forum to

26

See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to InternationalDefault, 98 MICH. L.

REv. 2276, 2292 93 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, Global Solution]; Donald T. Trautman et al., Four
Models for InternationalBankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. LAW 573, 575 76 (1993).
27 See, e.g., Trautman, supra note 26, at 575 76.; Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 26, at
2292 93; Andre J. Berends, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive
Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 313 (1998); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Laiw and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 461
(1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Choice of Law].

28 Trautman, supra note 26, at 575 ("[A] fundamental tenet of the bankruptcy policies of most
civilized countries is to treat all similarly situated creditors equally .... "I
29 See, e.g., Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 26, at 2292 97.
:3o See generally Perkins, A Defense ofPure Universalism, supranote 23.
31 See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to InternationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1, 6 10 (1997) [hereinafter Rasmussen, A New Approach].
32

See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 5 (Harvard Univ.

Press 1986).
33 Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism,supra note 23, at 805-06.
34 See, e.g., Rasmussen, A New Approach, supranote 31, at 27; Lucian A. Bebchuck & Andrew T.
Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775, 779 (1999)
[hereinafter Bebchuck & Guzman, Economic Analysis].
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increase its share of the pie administered for domestic creditors, a single court would
improve dramatically the possibility of reorganization and the preservation of the
value of an international business group.35
Transaction costs are particularly problematic for international bankruptcies.
Multiple insolvency cases in several countries for the same debtor duplicate
transaction costs and vastly decrease economic efficiency.36 Differences in legal
systems also add substantial costs because the decision-makers must educate
themselves in the laws of every country involved.
2.

Modified Universalism

The pure universalism approach is merely aspirational because there is a
decided lack of harmony in the global economic structure, and each country has its
own insolvency regime with its own principles and goals."
Modified universalism embraces universalism's core belief of cooperation, but
maintains the primacy of local courts' power to exercise discretion with respect to
"the fairness of the home country procedures" and with respect to protecting the
interests of local creditors.38 In essence, "[m]odified universalism is universalism
tempered by what is practical at the current stage of international legal
development."3 9 Thus, modified universalism allows for a single main case for a
multinational concern in its home country (however defined), with the insolvency of
the multinational concern governed primarily by the laws of its home country.
However, modified universalism recognizes that the main case may need support
through secondary or ancillary cases in other countries where assets or creditors are
located. 40 A local court, under this view, normally applies domestic law to its
proceedings, and it retains the discretion to evaluate the fairness of home country
procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors where appropriate.41

11
36

Westbrook, Global Solution, supranote 26, at 2293.
See In re Bd. ofDirs. ofMulticanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486,521 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).

37 Compare the insolvency regimes of Germany and France, which are both now subject to the EU
Regulation. German insolvency law creates a presumption that a business should be liquidated. The
German court will only undertake a reorganization if the creditors choose this route and only after the
insolvency administrator reports on the debtor's economic situation. See lnsolivenzordnung [InsO]
[Insolvency

Statute],Oct.

5,

1994,

BGBl.

I

at

2866,

§§

156-159,

available

at

http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/lnsO.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2008). In contrast, France presumes
the reorganization of a business in order to permit the survival of the business, the preservation of
employees and employment, and the discharge of liabilities, in this order. See Richard L. Koral & MarieChristine Sordino, The New Bankruptcy ReorganizationLaw in France: Ten Years Later, 70 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 437, 453 (1996).

18 Emilie Beavers, Note, Bankruptcy Law Harmonization In The NAFTA Countries: The Case of
The United States and Mexico, 2003 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 965, 982 (2003).
39 David Neiman, International Insolvency and Environmental Obligations: A Prelude to
Resolving the Conflicting Policies of a Clean Slate Versus a Clean Site in TransnationalBankruptcies,8
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 789, 826 (2003) (quoting AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
PROJECT: PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL CASES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 11 (Tentative Draft, 2000)).

40 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 26, at 2300-0 1;Westbrook, Choice ofAvoidance
Law, supra note 17, at 514-15.
"1
See Westbrook, Global Solution, supranote 26, at 2301.
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Modified universalism recognizes that the choice of forum in a multinational
concern, and thus the choice of insolvency law, may significantly affect the
substantive rights of parties in interest outside the forum country. To participate in a
foreign case, creditors would need to learn the applicable procedures and be forced
to hire local counsel to protect their rights.
The concepts of predictability and party expectations are particularly important
here. It is assumed that when entering into transactions with a multinational concern,
parties take into account the legal systems and rules, including insolvency laws, that
are likely to govern the performance and enforcement of the parties' commitments to
each other. Where there is uncertainty as to what legal systems govern, transaction
costs are higher and the difference in benefit distribution rules in competing legal
systems may reward those who guessed correctly or who had the power to control
the choice of forum and of law, not those to whom the economic benefit of the
transaction belonged. Thus the application of varying distribution rules may result in
the parties' entering into sub-optimal transactions, and leave them poorer than they
would have been otherwise.42
Modified universalism recognizes the problems of a global system where
debtors can easily choose a substantive law that will govern their insolvency and that
is contrary to the expectations and interests of creditors. It thus authorizes the
commencement and prosecution of secondary cases to liquidate local assets and
protect local creditors in a particular country. These secondary cases are territorial,
for the most part, under both the EU Regulation and the Model Law. 43 This is the
approach the United States adopted in chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.44 A form
of modified universalism has been adopted by other countries as well, including:
"Australia, Canada, England, Germany, India, Ireland, New Zealand . . . and,
arguably, Japan. 4 5 The adoption of modified universalism's principles by some of
the world's largest economies provides strength to claims by the theory's supporters
that modified universalism is the most widely used approach to cross-border
insolvency.46
"[One] advantage of ... modified [universalism] is that it retains some of the
efficiencies of pure universalism while incorporating the flexibility and discretion of

12

See Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, in COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION

FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 207 32 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2005)

[hereinafter LoPucki, Global and Out of Control] (presenting this argument and offering the scenario of a
German court deciding the priorities of U.S. workers in a hypothetical DaimlerChrysler AG bankruptcy).
However, this argument fails to acknowledge that under the new U.S. insolvency regime,
DaimlerChrysler would most likely file a secondary case or cases in the United States to determine the
rights of creditors in relation to its U.S. entities.
13 See Model Law, supranote 11, arts. 15 24.
11 Paul L. Lee, Ancillary Proceedings Under Section 304 and Proposed Chapter 15 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 115,123 (2002).
15 Kent Anderson, The Cross-BorderInsolvency Paradigm:A Defense of the Modified Universal
Approach Considering the Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 679, 692 n.37 (2000)
[hereinafter Anderson, Insolvency Paradigm].

41 See id. at 691-92. But see Frederick Tung, Is InternationalBankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 31, 39-40 (2001) [hereinafter Tung, Possible] ("Analysts agree that territoriality is and has
always been the dominant practice.").
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the . . . territorial approaches described [above] .'4 The modified approach does not
accomplish all of the benefits of universalism explained above; however, it does
allow for a coordinated liquidation or reorganization. 48 Further, the modified method
allays the fears of "those who are concerned about relinquishing national
sovereignty, [because each jurisdiction] retain[s] the power to refuse to" submit to
the insolvency laws of other countries.49 Overall, the most positive aspect of
modified universalism may be that "its pragmatic flexibility [i.e., its partial
utilization of territorialism] provides the best fit with the problem presented by the
current patchwork of laws in the global market, and ... it will foster the smoothest
and fastest transition to true universalism. 5 °
B.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Universalism

Universalism has the potential to yield significant benefits in an insolvency.s 1
These include a more efficient ex ante allocation of capital, 52 reduced administrative
and legal costs due to a reduction in the number of proceedings, 53 avoidance of
forum shopping and the race to file, 54 facilitated reorganizations, 55 substantially
increased liquidation value, 56 and greater clarity and certainty to all parties in interest
in most circumstances. 5' Furthermore, international cohesion and cooperation lower
transaction costs and, therefore, increase the flow of international trade.58 Under a
unified approach to cross-border insolvency, business people, investors, and lenders
would be better able to quantify the risk associated with any potential international
bankruptcy,59 increasing information available on the market and thereby reducing
the inefficiency in the international credit market.60 Finally, a single approach
"would also promote fairness and equality [in] the distribution of assets to all
creditors by virtue of' administering a cross-border bankruptcy case in "one central
forum under one law. 61

17 Anderson, Insolvency Paradigm,supranote 45, at 691.
18 Id.
19 Id.
51 Westbrook, Global Solution, supranote 26, at 2277.
'1 See Elizabeth J. Gerber, Note, Not All Politics Is Local: The New Chapter15 to Govern CrossBorder Insolvencies, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2051, 2084 85 (2003); see also Westbrook, Choice of Law,
supra note 27, at 465.
51 Bebchuck & Guzman, Economic Analysis, supra note 34, at 778.
53 id.
54 See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 31, at 18.
55 Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 27, at 465.
5, Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 31, at 18.
57 See Westbrook, Choice of Law, supra note 27, at 465; Jay L. Westbrook, Universal
Participationin TransnationalBankruptcies, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

ROY GOODE 419, 421 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997) ("Territorialism produces distributions that are a function
of local priorities and the presence of a greater abundance of assets in one jurisdiction than in another ....
The distributions are always unpredictable and often unfair.").
5' Gerber, supra note 51, at 2084 (citing Brian M. Devling, Note, The Continuing Vitality of the
TerritorialApproach to Cross-BorderInsolvency, 70 UMKC L. REV. 435, 435 36 (2001)).
5I Id. at 2084 85.
60

See id. at 2085; ROBERT A. HAUGEN, THE INEFFICIENT STOCK MARKET: WHAT PAYS OFF AND

WHY 32-34 (1999) (stating market efficiency theory suggests that, in a market where investors have
perfect information, assets will be accurately priced).
6 Gerber, supra note 51, at 2085 (citing Sara Isham, Note, UAICITRAL's Model Lau, on Cross-

2008]

COORDINATING CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY

While universalism has widespread support in the academic community, until
recently governments have been reluctant to adopt it.62 Any proposal that advocates
international comity requires that adherents give up a measure of national
sovereignty. Furthermore, when given the choice, multinational corporations will
most likely file bankruptcy in a developed country, which may be to the detriment of
developed countries that must recognize the main insolvency proceeding. Finally,
some of the rules of universalist regimes, the most striking being on the issue of the
insolvency of corporate groups, have not yet been fully developed.
1.

National Sovereignty

Attempts to "harmoniz[e] insolvency law strike[] at the heart of deep-seated
cultural differences and legal codes founded on quite different principles. ' 3 In
general, countries are unwilling to have the laws of another country encroach on
their sovereignties.64 This is especially true in a bankruptcy context, because
"bankruptcy law is 'meta-law' . . . . [I]t overrides contract-, property-, and other
legal rights that exist outside of bankruptcy" such as commercial and family law.65
Lynn LoPucki, a professor at the University of California, Los Angeles School
of Law, has developed his famous DaimlerChrysler example to show how various
national legal rights would be trampled under a universalist approach.66 In this
hypothetical, DaimlerChrysler files for protection under German insolvency law, and
under a universalist approach, Chrysler plant workers in Detroit would have to file a
claim in German court to claim their wages and benefits. Thus, the fate of these
workers' claims would be determined under German, not U.S., law.
Unfortunately this example is misleading as to both the legal operations of most
(modified) universalist regimes and as to their economic effects. Firstly, as will be
explained in more detail below, modified universalist systems provide for the
distribution of local assets in accord with the law of the place where the asset is
located at the time of bankruptcy.6 Secondly, as Andrew Guzman, professor at the
University of California, Berkeley School of Law, explains, the economic benefits of
a universalist system far outweigh any marginal harm to employees. Employees
belong to a group that Guzman terms "weakly nonadjusting creditors." These
creditors, to a large degree, cannot or will not adjust the terms of their loans on a
case-by-case basis to account for the risks associated with the loan, including the risk
of nonpayment.68 In essence, his argument is that while the costs of universalism

Border Insolvency: A Workable Protectionfor TransnationalInvestment at Last, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
1177, 1177 79(2001)).
62
See Tung, Possible, supra note 46, at 37 (quoting Guzman, In Defense of Universalism, supra

note 17, at 2184).
63
Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 936 (1994) (quoting HarmonizingEuropean Insolvency Laws A British Perspecitve,
reprintedin WKLY. NEWS AND COMMENT, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Dec. 10, 1992, at A3).
4 Tung, Possible, supra note 46, at 46.
Id. at 47 (citing Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings,70

AM. BANKR. L.J. 485,486 (1996)).
66 LoPucki, Case, supra note 19, at 2223.
See id. at 2221.
Westbrook, Choice ofLaw, supra note 27, at 466.
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increase when nonadjusting creditors are accounted for, these costs are far
outweighed by the benefits of universalism. 9 Moreover, the costs of universalism to
such creditors are minimal because 1) the terms of the nonadjusting creditors'
lending are generally only indirectly affected by the choice of bankruptcy law; 2)
nonadjusting creditors' claims, while perhaps numerous, generally comprise a small
percentage of the total amount involved in an insolvency; 3) national systems rarely
provide priority status to unsecured trade creditors and limited priority status to
employees; and, 4) weakly nonadjusting creditors can adapt their behavior, without
incurring large expense, to reduce the costs of universalism. 7°
2.

Discrimination Against Lesser-Developed Countries

Universalism also has the potential to discriminate against lesser-developed
countries. 71 Most multinational companies have their principle places of business in
industrial, developed countries. 72 Under a universalism approach, therefore,
whenever a multinational company files for bankruptcy protection, the law of a
developed country will govern over the law of lesser-developed countries.
3.

Determination of the Home Country of Corporate Groups

Finally, one of the biggest criticisms of universalism is the uncertainty
surrounding how to determine the home country of a multinational corporation.
Judge Tina L. Brozman, sitting in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York, criticized the practicality of this concept in Barclays Bank v. Maxwell
Communication Corp. (In re Maxwell Communication Corp.). 75 Judge Brozman has
explained:
[I]n an age of multinational corporations, it may be that two
(or more) countries have equal claim to be the "home country" of
the debtor. Certainly, one could not simply employ the nation of
incorporation alone . . . . [O]ne must look at this factor and . . .
factors such as . . . the [location of the] debtor's "nerve center,"
assets, and creditors . . . and where the debtor's business is
primarily conducted. 76
As a result, it is possible for creditors and courts to disagree as to the home
country of a single corporate group.

9

Id.

70I d.
7 Frederick Tung, Fear of Commitment in InternationalBankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 555, 576 77 (2001).
72 id.
73 Id. at 577.

7' Barclays Bank v. Maxwell Commc'ns Corp. (In re Maxwell Commc'ns Corp.), 170 B.R. 800,
817, n.22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
15
Id. at 817.
76

id.
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4.

Modified Universalism's Disadvantages

Modified universalism has its own particular set of disadvantages, and the
implication of the criticism is that it has neither the advantages of territorialism nor
the advantages of universalism. Some of the clearest weaknesses are as follows: 1)
modified universalism "sacrifices nearly all of the supposed advantages of
universalism" by "relieving courts of the non-forum country from the obligation to
sacrifice their own creditors' interests for the benefit of foreigners;" 2) it introduces
additional uncertainties, because "the regime or regimes that will ultimately
distribute the debtor's assets may depend on the country in which the assets are
located at the time of bankruptcy," and "for the lender to predict the regime
applicable to distribution at the time of the loan, the lender must guess what intercountry differences in bankruptcy law the forum court will consider substantial;" 3)
it "could generate a bankruptcy proceeding in every country in which the debtor has
assets, and perhaps even more;" 4) "it does not address the core problem of
identifying the home country."" However, territorialist critics of modified
universalism might do well to note that forms of modified universalism include
distinctly territorialist aspects.8
C. Territorialism
Territorialism is the view that a bankruptcy case should be used only to
administer the domestic assets of a multinational debtor under domestic law for the
benefit of domestic creditors, whether through reorganization or liquidation. 79
According to this view, assets located abroad should be administered in their own
cases in the countries where they are located,80 without much regard for the
enterprise as a whole.81
Multinational companies have responded to territoriality by placing their
holdings in each country in separate business associations formed under local law.82
These associations comprise three forms: 1) "free-standing, self-sufficient businesses
that the local country can reorganize or liquidate in accordance with local law"; 2)
"subsidiaries that own only the local assets of an integrated, international business";
and 3) "a foreign entity that ... own[s] local assets directly. 8 13 "In these latter two
circumstances, international cooperation may be needed to reorganize the business or
liquidate its assets for the best price. 8 4

" Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism, supra note 23, at 803 n.69 (citing LoPucki,
Cooperation,supranote 24, at 732).
71 Cf Gerber, supra note 51, at 2059 n.54 ("[T]erritorialism may seem similar to modified

universalism"); Bufford, Global Venue Controls, supra note 11, at 124 (stating that a Model Law
secondary case is "rather like a cooperative territorialist case.").
71 See LoPucki, Cooperation,supra note 24, at 742 43.
2

See id. at 742.
See, e.g., In re

Bd. of Dirs. of Multicanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486, 522 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(describing traditional territorialism).
12 LoPucki, Case, supra note 19, at 2219.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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Territoriality enters the international realm when a multinational's financial
problems affect its entities in multiple countries. At this stage, territorialists invoke a
cooperative territorialist approach. Essentially, advocates of this view maintain that
in such cases, the necessary international cooperation takes place. 5 The parent firm
or respective government authority initiates bankruptcy proceedings in each country
where the corporate group has substantial assets.8 6 Each court appoints a
"representative" for the estate of each entity filing in its jurisdiction and those
representatives negotiate a solution to the debtor's financial problems.8 "If the
estates are worth more in combination than they are separately, it will be in the
interests of the representatives to combine them." 8 In the absence of an agreement,
conflict of laws rules and priority rules of the country where an asset is located will
determine who shares in the asset and in what proportion. 9
1. Cooperative Territorialism
The cooperative territorialist approach, as advanced by Professor LoPucki,
begins with the territorialist structure. When a multinational company's financial
problems extend across borders, each financially distressed entity files for
bankruptcy in each country where it has significant assets. 90 Each of the filings has
equal standing. 91 Bankruptcy courts of a country will administer the assets of a
multinational debtor within the borders of that country as a separate estate. Thus,
with equal power and authority, "[e]ach of the bankruptcy courts would assume
jurisdiction over the local assets[;] would determine whether to cooperate in a
multinational reorganization or liquidation[;] and[,] in the event of liquidation, each
would distribute the assets of the company among creditors and shareholders under
local law.

92

Initially this approach does not seem much different than pure territorialism.
Thus, the key to this approach in the international context is a cooperative element. 93
Essentially, where international cooperation is needed in cross-border insolvency
proceedings, each court appoints an administrator.94 The administrators of the
various estates negotiate and obtain court approval of an agreement ("protocol") that
provides the terms for cooperation in the particular case.95 These protocols result in

15

Id. at 2219.

8' Id.
87 id.
88

Id.

2

See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 304(c)(4) (2005) (authorizing the turnover of U.S. assets to foreign

bankruptcy proceedings "consistent with . . . distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in
accordance with the order prescribed by [the United States Bankruptcy Code]").
"'

LoPucki, Cooperation,supra note 24, at 743.

91
92

Id.
Id.

93 Farley, supranote 12, at 199.
94 Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 162 (2005) [hereinafter
LoPucki, Universalism Unravels].
95 See, e.g., Protocol and Implementing Court Order from the Maxwell Communications
Corporation Bankruptcy, reprinted in JACOB S. ZIEGEL, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 636 (1994).
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mutually beneficial procedures or substantive resolutions.96 In some cases, however,
"protocols are unnecessary because [a] foreign administrator [has sought] and
[received] cooperation of other countries in ancillary proceedings." 9 '
Professor LoPucki advances five areas of cooperation that are designed to
eliminate "the tension between countries by vesting each with bankruptcy power
congruent with its sovereignty." 98 First, he proposes "the establishment of
procedures for replicating claims filed [in a bankruptcy proceeding] in any one
country," in any additional countries in which the debtor has filed.99 Second, he
proposes "sharing of distribution lists by [client] representatives to ensure . . .
distributions [are not made] to creditors who have already recovered the full amounts
owed to them." 100 Third, he suggests various jurisdictions work together in "the joint
sale of assets, when a joint sale would produce a [greater return] than separate sales
in multiple countries. "' 1 1 Fourth, Professor LoPucki recommends "the voluntary
investment by [parties] in one country [to] the debtor's reorganization effort in [other
countries]. 10 2 Last, he suggests various jurisdictions cooperate with respect to "the
seizure and return of assets that have been the subject of avoidable transfers." 103
LoPucki thus establishes two methods by which states can achieve the desired
cooperation. The first method is the version of cooperative territorialism, advanced
above, that "is designed to serve as a foundation for, and to encourage, mutually
beneficial cooperation by representatives of particular bankruptcy estates. 10 4 The
second method is for countries to cooperate on a variety of matters through treaty or
convention.10'
2.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Territorialism

a.

Advantages

Advocates of territorialist systems, especially the cooperative version, point to
four main advantages: 1) predictability; 2) expectations of parties; 3) voidable
transfers; and 4) cooperation.
Cooperative territorialism is essentially the system that is in operation in most of
the world's countries today. 10 6 Under a territorialist system, the bankruptcy
administration of a multinational's assets and operations within a given country is
governed by the laws of that country. This is the expectation that credit extenders
have at the time they lend to the multinational concern.

"

LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supranote 94, at 162.

97

id.

9' LoPucki, Cooperation,supra note 24, at 750.
99

Id.

Id.
Id.
102 id.
103 id.
114Id. at 742.
115 See id.; see also id. at 758-59 (admitting that the problem of strategic removal of assets before
bankruptcy is a greater problem under a territorialist regime than under a universalist regime).
1' LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supranote 94, at 160.
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A multinational concern can transfer its assets and operations from country to
country with relative ease. Supporters of territorialism argue, however, that such
transfers "are generally limited to a small portion of the debtor's assets, [that] they
occur incrementally, and [that] they are highly visible." 107 There may be special
concern about eve-of-bankruptcy transfers under a territorialist system, but the effect
of such transfers on creditor priorities is limited to the assets transferred.108
Territorialists would argue that it is reasonable to assume that creditors whose
interests would be materially affected by such a transfer can anticipate a transfer and
can negotiate a domestically enforceable clause in any lending contract that prevents
or hinders a transfer. 10 9
Territorialists argue that those whose rights are affected by an eve-ofbankruptcy "transfer can file claims in the country to which the transfer was made
and reach the assets indirectly." 110 Most countries employ a rule that effects a
worldwide pro rata distribution to each general creditor, regardless of nationality.111
"Only in the case where the transfer is from a country where insufficient assets
remain to pay local priority claims or to a country that before the transfer did not
have sufficient assets1 to
pay local priority claims is the transfer likely to affect
12
creditor entitlements."'
Furthermore, with the slight modifications suggested by Professor LoPucki,
territorialists argue that, because sufficient inducement exists, bankruptcy
administrators tend to cooperate on a international level. First, if assets of a
"multinational would bring a higher price if sold together, it will be in the [best]
interests of administrators to sell them together and split the additional proceeds
'
among them."113
Second, protocols have become enormously helpful in cross-border
cases. In other cases, numerous examples of cooperation between U.S. and Canadian
courts developed under the now-defunct Bankruptcy Code section 304.114
b.

Disadvantages

Critics of territorialism mainly point to higher overall costs of a multinational
insolvency, which are due to the lack of an effective structure of judicial
cooperation.
First, the bankruptcy costs for an international business are
enormously multiplied by the necessity of a parallel insolvency
case in each country where assets are located. Each jurisdiction
107 id.

Id.
Id. at 160 61.
Id. at 161.
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, MultinationalEnterprises in GeneralDefault: Chapter 15, The ALl
Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation,76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 18 (2002) [hereinafter Westbrook,

MultinationalEnterprises] ("A creditor that receives a distribution in a foreign insolvency proceeding
must stand aside in a local distribution until creditors of the same class (under local law) have gotten as
much from the local proceeding as the first creditor got from the foreign one.").
112 LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supranote 94, at 161.

.. Id. at 162.
114 ld.
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requires separate administration, separate filing and evaluation of
claims, and separate prosecution of relevant litigation. Second,
reorganization is much more difficult to achieve in a territorialist
regime because it decreases liquidation values and makes
coordination of cases extremely complex. Third, conflicts between
jurisdictions and courts can easily develop. Fourth, creditors
cannot know in advance where the debtor's assets will be located
when bankruptcy intervenes, which causes a less efficient ex ante
allocation of capital. Fifth, distribution results are both uneven,
violating the bankruptcy principle of treating similarly situated
creditors equally, and unpredictable, increasing the cost of capital
because of the uncertain outcome if insolvency supervenes.
Finally, under territorialism, both the debtor and individual
creditors can engage in strategic behavior to advance their private
interests at the expense of the general interests of creditors.115

Additionally, problems may arise because the bankruptcy laws of particular
countries do not authorize cooperation or because courts are given the discretion to
cooperate and choose not to, even when cooperation would increase the value of the
local estate. Although the areas of cooperation that Professor LoPucki has advocated
would enhance the efficiency of contemporary transnational bankruptcy, without
statutory mandate there is no guarantee under the cooperative territorialism approach
that numerous jurisdictions would cooperate, even if there were rational financial
inducement to do so.116 Territorialists counter that "a country that will not authorize
cooperation on a limited territorial
basis will certainly not do so on the much more
' 11 7
extensive basis of universalism."
The cooperative territorialists' proposal of multilateral convention ignores the
current lack of multilateral cooperation.118 However, cooperative territorialism may
be pragmatic in that it accepts that, in a world still dominated by sovereign nationstates, harmonization of bankruptcy laws is impractical, but territorial-based
cooperation is possible. 119
III. THE MODEL LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION
The two major sources of law for international cooperation in transnational
insolvency cases are the Model Law and the European Union Regulation, which
were both drafted in the 1990s. UNCITRAL drafted the Model Law for adoption as
internal legislation in any country and issued it in 1997. The EU Regulation was
promulgated in 2000, and it became effective in 2001. While this article does not
115 Bufford, Global Venue Controls,supra note 11, at 114 (internal citations omitted).
"" Cf Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism, supra note 23, at 823 (stating that cooperative

territoriality would encourage "mutually beneficial cooperation" among countries).
117 LoPucki, Case, supra note 19, at 2219.
...Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 26, at 2308 ("Professor LoPucki's territorial system is
made cooperative and coherent through adoption of a convention, but it retains most of the disadvantages
of any territorial system.").
Tung, Possible, supra note 46, at 37.
l..
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discuss the EU Regulation in great detail, it is useful to compare the Regulation's
purer form of universalism with the Model Law's modified universalism.
A.

Common Featuresof the Model Law and European Union Regulation

Both the Model Law and the EU Regulation give primacy to an insolvency case
that is opened in a debtor's home country. Only that case can be a main case, the
opening of which is entitled to recognition in other countries where the Model Law
or the EU Regulation is in force. All cases in other countries subject to the Model
Law or the EU Regulation are secondary to this main case.
Under modified universalism, the home country, for the purposes of a main
insolvency case of a multinational business concern, is the country where the
concern's "center of main interests" (COMI) is located. This is the key concept used
by the Model Law 120 and the EU Regulation. 121 The country where the COMI is
located is the proper location for the main case, 122 and cases in other countries should
generally be limited to secondary cases. 123 The law governing the insolvency case
124 is
that of the country where the COMI is located and where the main case belongs.
COMI is a universalist concept, but the challenge of answering where the COMI
is located is answered by a territorialist presumptive rule. The Model Law provides:
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor's registered office . . . is

presumed to be the centre of the debtor's main interests. 125 The EU Regulation has a
similar provision. 126 Recital 13 of the preamble to the EU Regulation provides that
"[the 'centre of main interests' should correspond to the place where the debtor
conducts the administration ' of
his interests on a regular basis and is therefore
12
ascertainable by third parties." 1
The EU Regulation gives critical importance to two factors in determining the
location of the COMI. First, the COMI is located at the place where the debtor
conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis, which essentially
means the place where it administers its commercial, industrial, or professional
activities.1 2 Second, this is an objective test based on what is apparent to third
121 See Model Laiw, supra note 11, art. 2(b); Bob Wessels, International Jurisdiction to Open
Insolvency Proceedings in Europe, In ParticularAgainst (Groups off Companies 4 10 (2003), available
at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/option,com-jdownloads/Itemid, 10 /task,viewcategory/catid,39/

(explaining the concept of COMI under the EU Regulation) (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
121 See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, art. 3.1, 2000 O.J. (L 160).
122 See id.; see also Model Law, supranote 11, art. 2(b); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1502(4) (2005).
123 See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, art. 3.2 3.

124 Standard rules of conflict of laws (or international private law, as the subject is known outside
the United States) should be applied in many contexts in insolvency cases, and in some instances these
rules will dictate the application of foreign law in the forum of the main case. See, e.g., Maxwell
Commc'ns Corp. v. Societe Generale, 93 F.3d 1036, 1048-50 (2d Cir. 1996).
125 Model Laiv, supranote 11, art. 16(3).
12 See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, art. 3.1.
12IId. pmbl., recital 13. In EU law, EU regulation preambles have been treated as equally

authoritative as the main text of the regulation. See, e.g., In re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [2004] S.C. 47 (Ir.),
atl10.
128 See Miguel Virgos & Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings 5 1,
available at http://aei.pitt.edu/952/01 /insolvency report schmidt 1988.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2008)..
The Virgos & Schmit report was the principal report on the EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings,
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parties, and especially to creditors. 129 Thus, a creditor's view of where the COMI is
located is an important factor in its determination. Miguel Virgos and Etienne
Schmit explain the rationale for this rule: "Insolvency is a foreseeable risk. It is
therefore important that international jurisdiction ... be based on a place known to
the debtor's potential creditors. This enables the legal risks which would have to be
assumed in the case of insolvency to be calculated."13 Under both the Model Law
and the EU Regulation, each company has a single COMI and can have only one
main case."'
One of the main critiques of the COMI analysis, under both the Model Law and
the EU Regulation, is that it must be made separately for each legal entity. Neither
the Model Law nor the EU Regulation provides for the coordination of the
insolvency cases of related entities within a corporate group. More specifically,
neither system authorizes the filing or opening of a main case for a particular
company in a specific country because
a parent company or other affiliate has
13 2
opened a main case in that country.
B. The UNCITRAL Model Law: Modified Universalismwith a Territorialist
Foundation
"UNCITRAL is the core legal body in the United Nations" designed to promote
unification and harmonization of international trade law. 13 3 In an effort to encourage
consistency in the field of international bankruptcy, UNCITRAL adopted a Model
Law on cross-border insolvency on May 30,
1997.134 The Model law is a concise,
135
procedurally focused thirty-two article text.
The Preamble of the Model law states:
The purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms
for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency so as to promote
the objectives of:
Cooperation between the courts and other competent
authorities of this State and foreign States involved in cases of
cross-border insolvency;
Greater legal certainty for trade and investments;

which was converted into the EU Regulation by the substitution of articles 44-47 (implementing the EU
Regulation) for articles 43 46 and 48 55 (providing formalities for treaty implementation).
121See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, pmbl., recital 13.
131See Virgos & Schmit, supra note 128, at 51.
131See Berends, supranote 27, at 355.
132It appears that the EU Regulation authorizes a liquidator in a main case to open a secondary case
for a related entity in the same country, notwithstanding that the related entity's COMI is located
elsewhere. See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, art. 29 and pmbl. 19.
133Spiros V. Bazinas, Multi-Jurisdictional Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL'S Impact on
Securitization and Cross-BorderPeifection, 12 DUKE J. COMP.& INT'L L. 365, 365 n.2 (2002).
134See Model Law, supranote 11; see also Evan D. Flaschen et al., Foreign Representatives in U.S.
Chapter 11 Cases: Filling the Void in the Law of MultinationalInsolvencies, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 3, 18
(2001).
115 Ronald J. Silverman, Advances in Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation: The UA[CITRAL
Model Law on Cross-BorderInsolvency, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265, 267 (2000).
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Fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies
that protects the interests of all creditors and other interested
persons, including the debtor;
Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor's
assets; and
Facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled business,
thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.136
These objectives are very similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's "central
purpose of . . . marshal[ing] creditors and organiz[ing] distribution." 13 7 True to its
territorialist elements, the Model Law does not preempt the substantive law of
different jurisdictions; "rather, it provides a [method] for the . . . interdependent
operation of various local laws, courts and court appointees."1 3 To accomplish the
objectives of the Model Law, as well as to enhance the insolvency laws of various
jurisdictions, the drafters of the Model Law enumerated nine general territorialist
and universalist principles.1 39 Those principles are:
The court of the enacting State shall recognize only one
foreign proceeding as foreign main proceeding.
The recognition of a foreign proceeding shall not restrict the
right to commence a local proceeding.
A local proceeding shall prevail over the effects of foreign
proceeding and over relief granted to a foreign representative,
regardless of whether the local proceeding was opened prior to or
after the recognition of foreign proceeding.
When there are two or more proceedings, there shall be
cooperation and coordination.
A foreign proceeding shall be recognized as a foreign main
proceeding if the foreign proceeding is opened in the State where
the debtor maintains the center of his main interests. A foreign
proceeding shall be recognized as a foreign non-main proceeding if
the foreign proceeding is opened in a State where the debtor has an
establishment.
Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding as a foreign main
proceeding, some types of relief will come into effect
automatically .... Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding as a
foreign non-main proceeding, relief can only come into effect if it
is granted by the court.

131, See Model Lauw, supranote 11, pmbl., recital (e).
137 Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Go Directly to Jail; Do Not Collect $200, 22 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44 (2004) (quoting In re Simonini, 282 B.R. 604, 620 n.16 (W.D.N.C. 2002)).
Flaschen et al., supra note 134, at 18.

See Berends, supranote 27, at 320-21.
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Coordination may include granting relief to the foreign
representative. In granting relief to a foreign representative of a
foreign non-main proceeding, the court must be satisfied that the
relief relates to assets falling under the authority of the foreign
representative.
Creditors shall be allowed to file claims in any proceeding.
Payments to creditors from multiple proceedings shall be
equalized.
If there are surplus proceeds of a local non-main proceeding,
they shall be transferred to the main proceeding.140

C. Process
The Model Law (and chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) is invoked by an
application by a foreign representative for recognition of a foreign proceeding.141
Such recognition is required if the foreign proceeding meets the statutory definition,
the foreign representative is duly authorized, and the application meets the formal
requirements and is made in the proper court. 142 The court granting recognition must
decide whether the foreign proceeding at issue is a main proceeding or a non-main
proceeding. 143 The foreign proceeding must be recognized as a main proceeding if
the debtor's COMI is located in that country, or as a non-main proceeding if the
debtor merely has an establishment there.144
Under the Model Law, where a country has recognized a main case in another
country, any subsequent domestic bankruptcy case in the recognizing country must
be a secondary case of limited scope. 145 Such a case is permitted only if assets of the
debtor are located in the recognizing country. 146 A subsequent secondary case
generally only affects the assets in the recognizing country (a clearly territorialist
restriction). 141 If a bankruptcy case is already pending in the country recognizing a
foreign main case, the Model Law then requires cooperation between the courts and
the administrators in the respective cases.148
IV. THE EU REGULATION: MODIFIED UNIVERSALISM WITH EMPHASIS
ON UNIVERSALISM
The EU Regulation, which took effect on May 30, 2002, was designed to
function in a community of nation-states that had similar cultural, historical,
141 Id. at 321 22.
141 See Model Law, supra note 11, art. 15(1); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1504. Article 15(2) specifies the
evidence that must accompany an application for recognition. See Model Law, supranote 11, art. 15(2).
142 See Model Law, supra note 11, art. 17(1). An exception to mandatory recognition is provided if

recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the forum country. See id.art. 6.
143 See id. art. 17(2).
144 The Model Law defines establishment as, "any place of operations where the debtor carries out a
non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods or services." Id. art. 2(f).
145 See id. art. 28.
141 See id.
141 See id.

141 See id. art. 29.
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political, and legal backgrounds. The EU Regulation is based on the principle of
mutual trust among the EU countries; 149 for the most part, they trust their fellow EU
countries with respect to both their substantive laws and their court procedures.150
So, it is not surprising that the EU Regulation takes a more universalist approach to
some aspects of insolvency, an approach that only works in a common economic
system where coordination and cooperation are the norm. Thus, the regulation
intends to encompass all of1the
debtor's assets on a world-wide basis and to affect all
51
creditors, wherever located.
Four main effects follow from the opening of a main case under the EU
Regulation.1 52 First, the laws of the country where the case is opened govern the
proceedings of the main case.1 53 Second, in contrast to the Model Law, all member
states automatically recognize a judgment opening a case from the date that the
judgment becomes effective in the home state. 154 Third, the opening of a main
insolvency case is supposed to produce the same effects in every member state as in
the home state (except as the EU Regulation provides otherwise), 55 except in a state
where a secondary case is opened.1 56 Fourth, the administrator in the main case may
exercise his or her powers in every EU state, including the powers of repatriating
assets,1 57 registering the judgment,1 58 and publishing notice in member states (again
subject to the opening of a local secondary case). The effects of the exercise of these
powers may only be challenged in the home court for the main case. 159 In addition, a
judgment opening a main case in any EU country imposes the domestic effects of
that case throughout the EU, except to the extent that the EU Regulation provides
otherwise.160
V.

SUBSEQUENT SECONDARY CASES

Both the Model Law and the EU Regulation provide for the filing of a
secondary or non-main case in a different country for the same legal entity.
The EU Regulation permits the opening of a secondary case in any country
where the debtor has an establishment, which means, "any place of operations where
the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and
goods." 161 The adoption of the law of the forum country for the main case and its
application throughout the EU are substantially affected if a secondary case is
141 See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, pmbl. 22.

151 See Wessels, supranote 120, at 14 15.
151 Virgos & Schmit, supra note, 128 at 51.
152See Wessels, supranote 120, at 1 2.
153See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, art. 4.
154 See id. art. 16.
155 The EU Regulation provides that local law governs contracts for the sale or use of real property,
settlement under payment or settlement systems for financial markets, contracts of employment, and
rights in real estate, ships, or aircraft subject to domestic registration systems. See Council Regulation
1346/2000, supranote 20, arts. 8 11.
151 See id. art. 17.
157 See id. art. 18.1.
151 See id. art. 22.
151 See id. art. 17.2.
"' See id. arts. 4.1, 17.1.
. Id. art. 2(h).
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opened in another EU country. 16 2 Under the EU Regulation, local law governs in part
the rights of creditors and the administration of assets in a secondary insolvency
case, a decidedly territorialist approach.163 While the EU Regulation requires that a
secondary case be a liquidation case, 164 it also authorizes the administrator in the
main case to obtain up to a three-month stay of the liquidation,165 and to propose a
reorganization according to the insolvency laws of the country where the secondary
case is opened.166
The Model Law has more complicated concerns about harmony between courts.
A court applying the Model Law must determine whether a foreign case given
recognition is a main case or a secondary ("non-main") case.1 6 A foreign case may
be recognized as a secondary case only if the country where it is located has an
establishment of the debtor. 68 Secondary cases have important universalist
components under the Model Law. The Law provides that, upon the recognition of a
foreign case as either a main or a secondary case, the court may, at the request of a
qualified foreign representative, entrust the distribution of all or part of the debtor's
domestic assets to that foreign representative or another person designated by the
court.
169 However, the Model Law imposes a territorial condition on such an order:
the court must be satisfied that the interests of domestic creditors are adequately
protected.170
While the EU Regulation provides for automatic recognition of a foreign
insolvency case within the EU, the Model Law provides a procedure for the
recognition of a case in another country, with territorialist limitations. The automatic
stay or moratorium of the Model Law takes effect in the recognizing country upon
the recognition of a foreign main proceeding.1 7 1 However, the moratorium applicable
upon the recognition of a foreign main proceeding under the Model Law is the
recognizing court's own moratorium, while under the EU Regulation the relevant
moratorium is that of the home country. In addition, upon the recognition of a
foreign secondary case, the recognizing court may issue an order for appropriate
relief, including a stay coextensive with the automatic stay resulting from the
recognition of a foreign main case. 17 2 Again, any administration of the debtor's
domestic assets by a foreign court representative is subject to the recognizing court's
approval. 171
The domestic impact of the recognition of a foreign main case differs under the
Model Law and the EU Regulation. Under the EU Regulation, a bankruptcy case in a

112 See id. arts. 27 38.
113 See id. art. 27.

114 See id.
115 See id. art. 33.
"' See id. art. 34.1.
167 See Model Lau,, supranote 11, art. 17(2).
, See id. art 17(2)(b).
1€9See id. art. 2 1(1)(e).
171 See id. art. 21(1).
171 See id. art. 20.
112 See id. art. 21(1)(a).
113 See id. art. 21(2).
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country where the debtor's COMI is not located must be a secondary case. 1 4
Because a secondary case requires an establishment of the debtor, the EU Regulation
prohibits the opening of an insolvency case in a non-COMI country where the debtor
lacks an establishment. 175 In contrast, the Model Law permits a non-COMI country
to commence an insolvency case under its own insolvency law where the debtor
lacks even an establishment. All that is necessary, for Model Law purposes, is that
the debtor has assets in that country. 1 6
A secondary case under the Model Law generally is limited to the
administration of the assets located in the host country. 177 However, such a case may
be used for two other purposes. First, it may be used to implement cooperation and
coordination with foreign courts and representatives under the provisions of the
Model Law (a universalist component). 171 Second, such a case may administer assets
not in the host country, where the host country's law provides that such assets should
be administered
in a bankruptcy case in that country (a more territorialist
17
provision). 1
VI. THE MODEL LAW: WHERE UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALISM
OVERLAP
Both sides of the universalism-territorialism debate agree that international
economic efficiency should be one of the main goals of any multinational insolvency
regime. However, exactly how one approaches economic efficiency and how each of
the main strands of international insolvency policy approaches the question
determine which regime one finds most beneficial. As we will see, territorialism
clearly excels in the area of predictability because it allows parties to calculate risk
in advance and enter into optimal transactions. Where the Model Law (and thus
chapter 15) mirrors a territorialist regime in this regard (e.g., secondary cases), it
advances international economic efficiency and protects U.S.-based creditors. Where
the Model Law advocates a more universalist approach with regard to predictability
(e.g., by using the "center of main interests" standard), predictability suffers, despite
the provision of other benefits.
However, the territorialist claim that cooperative territorialism induces
cooperation is weak. Giving courts wide discretion as to cooperation with foreign
courts and proceedings produces inconsistent decisions governing creditors in
similar situations. Such uncertainty inhibits the flow of international capital. To the
contrary, the modified universalist approach embodied in the Model Code and
chapter 15, with its presumption of international cooperation, advances these
efficiencies. The Model Law's artful, albeit imperfect, balance of territorial and
universalist elements provides strong protections for U.S. multinationals and their
creditors.

174 See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, art. 3.2.
175 See Wessels, supranote 120, at 11.
171, See Model Lauw, supranote 11, art. 28.
177 See id.
... See id.

...See id.
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Secondary Cases under the Model Law: Territorialism's Advantages

"The international bankruptcy system can be a success only if it is
predictable." 0 Creditors expect to know, at the time of their extensions, what laws
and procedures will determine their recovery rights. As Judge Samuel Bufford, who
sits on the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Los Angeles, has noted:
In calculating expected economic benefits, parties are assumed
to take into account the legal systems and rules that will likely
govern how their transactions are carried out and the benefits are
allocated. In addition, the parties must evaluate the risks
undertaken, including how these risks will be handled under the
applicable legal system. If it is uncertain what legal system will
govern the risks, it is difficult to quantify them. Where the
distribution rules of legal systems are different, the ultimate
beneficiaries of transactions may differ from those the parties have
anticipated ex ante. Thus the application of varying distribution
rules may result in the parties' entering into sub-optimal
transactions, and leave them poorer than they would have been
otherwise. 81
The territorialist aspects of the administration of secondary case under the
Model Law provide this predictability.
The Model Law permits a non-COMI country to commence a secondary
insolvency case under its own insolvency law where the debtor lacks even an
establishment. In order to file such a case under the Model Law, the debtor merely
must have assets in that country.18 2 In this way, a secondary case under the Model
Law is rather like a cooperative territorialist case8 3 and is limited to the
administration of the assets located in the host country. 8 4
Principles two and three of the Model Law establish the primacy of a local
proceeding over the authority of foreign proceedings. 8 5 These are clear expressions
of territorialism.'8 6 Of course, the Model Law establishes some cooperative
limitations on this pure territorialism. 8 If secondary proceedings (e.g., local
proceedings) have taken place before the main proceeding has begun (i.e., in a
foreign country), the secondary proceeding shall be reviewed by the court of the

"" LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supranote 94, at 158.
... Bufford, Global Venue Controls,supra note 11, at 112 13.
112 See Model Law, supranote 11, art.
28.
113 Bufford, Global Venue Controls, supra note 11, at 120 21.
114 See Model Law,supra note 11, art.
28.
115 Berends, supranote 27, at 321 22.
18 Tung, Possible, supra note 46, at 39 (stating that territorialism is the time-honored "behavior of

nations ... exercising jurisdiction over assets and parties within their borders").
187 Jay M. Goffman & Evan A. Michael, Navigating Through a Multinational Restructuring:
Cross-border Insolvencies, Proceedings and Workouts, Cross Border Insolvencies, A Comparative
Examination of Jnsolvency Laws ofIndustrialized Countries (Am. Bankr. Inst. CLE, 5th Annual N.Y. City
Bankr. Cont, May 5, 2003).
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main proceeding. 88 The court in the main proceeding can then modify or terminate
any relief previously granted if it is deemed inconsistent with the main proceeding.18 9
Consistent with the view of the Model Law that local courts, to the extent
possible, shall administer local assets, the court of the local proceeding has two
checks on the power of the foreign court of a main proceeding. Initially, a
representative of the court of the main proceeding must apply for recognition with
the local court.190 If proceedings have already taken place before the court, then the
court is well aware of the stakes involved or at least the potential impact on
creditors. Creditors get notice of the application and have an opportunity to
challenge it. Furthermore, the purpose of the secondary case under the Model Law is
not merely to serve in a subordinate role to the main case (though this may be part of
the process), but to provide a basis for coordination and cooperation with the main
case as well as to serve as a forum to administer assets that are best administered in
the local court and not in the foreign court. 191
If the court grants recognition to the main proceeding, it is fully aware that its
proceedings are now secondary. The court has an obligation under the Model Law to
cooperate with the main proceeding. If the court of the secondary proceeding has
already granted relief (already a consideration for the court of the secondary
proceeding when it grants recognition to the main proceeding), and the court of the
main proceeding modifies this relief, the court of the secondary proceeding has
options. Cooperation and coordination with the court of the main proceeding court
are two of them.
However, the Model Law also contains a provision that allows the recognizing
court to opt out of the Model Law, to refuse to enforce a judgment of the court of a
main proceeding, and to enforce the law of its own jurisdiction if an action would be
contrary to the public policy of that particular state. 192 This public policy exception is
especially powerful vis-A-vis the rights of creditors as established in principles eight
and nine. Additionally, the Model Law provides the possibility for local courts to
discriminate in the application of priorities when distributing assets to creditors.
[Under the "hotchpot rule," a] creditor that receives a distribution
in a foreign [bankruptcy] proceeding [cannot receive additional
distributions at another local proceeding involving the same
debtor] until creditors of the same class . . .have gotten as much
from the local proceeding as the first creditor [received in the
foreign proceeding]. 193

188 Id.
189

Id.

'9"See Model Law, supranote 11, art.
17.
'9' Id. art. 28.
192 Model Law, supranote 11, art.
6.

193Id. art. 32; Farley, supra note 12, at 216 (quoting Westbrook, MultinationalEnterprises, supra
note 11,at 18); see also David Costa Levenson, LL.MA[ THESES: Proposalfor Reform of Choice of

Avoidance Lat in the Context of InternationalBankruptcies from a US. Perspective, 10 AM.
INST. L. REV. 291, 347 (2002).
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Critics of the public policy exception have validly pointed out two of its
weaknesses: that the exception will swallow the rule and that, as bankruptcy law
affects a vast number of other areas, the exception is not equipped to define the
jurisdiction of courts over conflicting local and foreign laws. First, under the Model
Law and chapter 15, the presumption of the law is coordination and cooperation with
foreign courts. Thus, when making decisions, the local courts of secondary
proceedings must be cognizant of international comity. If the EU Regulation, with a
similar public policy exception, is any indication, then the194public policy exception
will be used rarely and only in the most egregious of cases.
Second, there are significant questions to be resolved over the extent of each
court's jurisdiction under the Model Law. Issues of bankruptcy jurisdiction have
already arisen in the United States and have to a large degree been resolved.195 In
other words, "if bankruptcy were to become universalist while the remainder of
regulatory law remained territorial, the system would have to grapple with a new,
problematic interface between the two." 196
To the extent that any new international legal system has to address complex
and conflicting laws of member jurisdictions, territorialist critics astutely point out
that these potential disputes are of significant economic consequence. However, the
territorialist provisions of the Model Law provide a safeguard, augmented by
universalism. Article 28 specifically envisions that some assets over which the court
of the main proceeding may have jurisdiction may best be administered by the local
court of the secondary proceeding. Thus, where issues of a cross-border insolvency
touch upon domestic laws that are subject to particular regulatory regimes (labor
contracts, pensions, environmental laws) or are politically sensitive, the expectation
of the Model Law is that these issues would either be given over to the court of
secondary proceedings to decide or the affected courts would collaborate through
their representatives on a mutually agreeable solution. 197 Guided by the underlying
principles of coordination and cooperation, courts of a main proceeding are unlikely
to issue orders in direct conflict with a fundamentally important regulatory regime of
a court of a secondary proceeding. If they do, a domestic court may invoke the
public policy exception under article 6.
B.
1.

Judicial Cooperation: Universalism'sAdvantages

The Model Law

The Preamble to the Model Law establishes, as its first and second purposes, the
promotion of the objectives of "[c]ooperation between the courts and other
194

See Model Lair, supra note 11, Pt. IV 20(e); Case C-341/04, Bondi v. Bank of America (In re

Eurofood IFSC Ltd.), 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813,
67 (holding that Italy's use of the public policy exception
disregarded relevant procedural rules guaranteed by this public policy).
115 See 11 U.S.C.A. 365(a)(3) (2005) (prohibiting changes in certain provisions of shopping center

leases); 11 IU.S.C.A. 1113 (2005) (detailing the requirements for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement); 11 U.S.C.A. 1114(e)(1) (2005) (requiring the continued payment of retiree benefits during
chapter 11 reorganization); 28 U.S.C.A. 1334 (2005) (giving bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over certain
actions and prohibiting them from assuming jurisdiction over others).
...LoPucki, Case, supra note 19, at 2238.
...See Model Law, supranote 11, arts. 7, 28.
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component authorities of ... [s]tates involved in cases of cross-border insolvency"
and "greater legal certainty of trade and investments."1' 9 Thus, the courts of those
nations that adopt the Model Law are exhorted from the very beginning to keep in
mind that the purpose of the law is to promote cooperation in the goal of facilitating
international trade and capital flows.
The structure of the Model Law also embodies these purposes. As noted above,
a secondary case is limited to the administration of the assets located in the host
country. However, such a case may be used for two other purposes. First, it may be
used to implement cooperation and coordination with foreign courts and
representatives under the provisions of the Model Law. Second, such a case may
administer assets not in the host country, where the host country's law provides that
such assets should be administered in a bankruptcy case in that country. In other
words, the secondary case is a formal mechanism, with the imprimatur of law,
whereby courts involved in cross-border insolvency cases can communicate and
cooperate with each other. Other provisions under the Model Law specifically exhort
domestic courts to cooperate and communicate with foreign courts or their
representatives and give them the ability to do so by various means formerly enjoyed
only among domestic courts. 199 While U.S. bankruptcy courts have long enjoyed
broad powers in adjudicating bankruptcy proceedings, 200 many foreign insolvency
courts have vastly circumscribed powers. Numerous U.S. bankruptcy courts have
experimented with, and have been partially successful in, the negotiation of
protocols with foreign insolvency courts. However, these have only been done on a
case-by-case basis, without clear rules of the limits of their jurisdiction, and only
through the slow diplomatic process of consular agents and rogatory letters.02°
In contrast, the Model Law provides the clear statutory authority and
expectation that courts of countries who have adopted the Model Law can initiate
and engage in direct communication, information sharing, and coordination with
other courts. Thus, the creativity of U.S. courts in reaching solutions to cross-border
insolvency issues is not inhibited but rather statutorily reinforced and expected.
Foreign bankruptcy courts that otherwise were limited to diplomatic channels in their
means of communication now have direct access to U.S. courts. This reduction of
barriers serves to increase information flow, solidify coordination of proceedings,
reduce administrative costs, and increase predictability.
2.

Cooperative Territorialism

Cooperative territorialism attempts to address the same problems endemic to
any cross-border insolvency case where courts in different countries have competing
jurisdiction, namely: cost and efficiency, the protection of creditors, the interaction

Model Law, supranote 11, pmbl. (a)-(b).
Id. arts. 24 27.
211 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000) (giving bankruptcy courts subject matter jurisdiction of civil
proceedings "arising under," "arising in," or "related to" cases under title 11).
211 Many major protocols are listed at http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/option,comjdownloads/
ltemid,1080/task,viewcategory/catid,395 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008). As one can see, these protocols are
all between countries that have a form of universalist system, not territorialist. Those listed on the website
are between the United States and Canada and the United Kingdom, respectively.
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with non-bankruptcy statutes, and the administration of corporate groups. This
article will address the latter two issues in greater detail below. Essentially, those
who advocate cooperative territorialism anticipate cooperation between judges of
competing jurisdictions on an ad hoc basis and only when mutually beneficial. When
a particular judge is not inclined to cooperate with a foreign insolvency proceeding,
there is no particular expectation that she or he does so.
However, to facilitate cooperation when it becomes necessary, Professor
LoPucki suggests five areas of cooperation: 1) procedures to replicate claims; 2)
sharing of distribution lists; 3) coordination to dispose of assets; 4) voluntary
participation by creditors in the foreign proceedings; and, 5) cooperation in the area
of avoidable transfers.20 2
There is, however, no guarantee under the cooperative territorialism approach
that numerous jurisdictions would cooperate. In order to accept the contention that
cooperative territorialism is the better solution, one must accept the premise that
bankruptcy judges have perfect information ex ante regarding a corporate group's
worldwide assets. The inducement that Professor LoPucki holds out for cross-border
cooperation under this scheme is that judges will recognize situations where the
bankruptcy estate will be enhanced by the sale of all the estate's assets as a whole
rather than piecemeal. However, more often than not, bankruptcy judges concern
themselves only with the assets they can immediately control and administrate (i.e.,
those assets within their own territory). Furthermore, without a statutory mandate,
domestic judges, not trained in international law or commerce, view cases through
the myopic lens of administering domestic assets they can understand rather than
venturing into the unknown world of international business, whether or not this
venture might be in the best interests of domestic creditors or the bankruptcy
estate.20 4
3.

International Judicial Cooperation in General

It is unrealistic to expect domestic judges, especially those who preside over
politically charged, high-profile multinational bankruptcy cases, to be immune from
domestic pressures and the bias inherent in the familiarity with one's own law. This
is not to say that individual judges do not subscribe to a degree of international
comity on a case-by-case basis. However, even where domestic statutes provide for a
great deal of discretion in when to account for the insolvency practices of other
countries, many national systems "tend to be universalistic, but only if they wish to
attract foreign assets in favour of their insolvency proceedings,, 20 5 while maintaining
"a strictly territorialistic attitude if they are asked to give away assets in favour of a

212 Farley, supranote 12, at 198.

213 Cf Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism, supra note 23, at 823 (stating that cooperative
territoriality would encourage mutually beneficial cooperation among countries).
214 Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 26, at 2314 15 (stating that territorialism is less able to

cope with the problems of international business life because "it turns upon a territorial model of
economic conduct that is outdated .... ").
205 Paul Volken, Cross-Border Insolvency: Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in 19 FORUM
INTERNATIONALE 21, 24 (1993).
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foreign insolvency case.. Thus we have the dual tensions of a judge, "who is
caught between the temptations of international law and respect for the domestic law
of his country, 20 on the one hand and the judge, "who must apply foreign law,
whether he is familiar with it or not. ' ' 20 8 The choice of status of international law in a
domestic system is a political one. 20 9 Thus, when a legislature instructs its judges to
account for international law in its decision-making, the political class needs to give
the judicial class a specific framework within which to make these decisions. This
has been done for the most part in chapter 15. However, the legislature must also
give judges the information and documentation that are essential for keeping up with
the evolution of international law.210 Only then can judges fully deliver on the
administrative and economic efficiencies promised by the Model Law.
VII. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
The efficacy of territorialist provisions' predictability and statutory expectations
of cross-border dialogue among courts is borne out in a comparison of the
Bankruptcy Code's old 304 with the new chapter 15. Prior to the enactment of
chapter 15, the former title 11 U.S.C. 304 was the provision of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code that, in part, dealt with international proceedings. The comity provision of 304
gave U.S. bankruptcy judges the broad powers to reach equitable decisions and to
cooperate with the law of other jurisdictions. However, such cooperation occurred
inconsistently and led to an inefficient and unpredictable administration of
international liquidations or restructurings. 211 The new chapter 15 was intended to
address these concerns.212
A.

The FormerSection 304

Under section 304, a foreign representative involved in a foreign bankruptcy
case could file an ancillary proceeding in a U.S. bankruptcy court as opposed to
initiating a full bankruptcy case against a debtor.2 3 Under 304, the qualifications of a
foreign representative were broadly construed. 21 4 "The purpose of [an ancillary] case
206

Id.

211 Multilateral Meeting of the Council of Eur. Legal Co-operation with Cent. and E. Fur.
Countries, Bucharest, Rom., Nov. 28 30, 1995, Presentationby Dinu lanculescu, Dir. of Int'l ud.Rel.
and Eur. Integration, Ministry of Justice, Romania, in THE JUDGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 165

(Council ofEur. Pub. 1998).
208

Id.
IId. at 166.
211 Multilateral Meeting of the Council of Eur. Legal Co-operation with Cent. and E. Fur.
Countries, Bucharest, Rom., Nov. 28 30, 1995, Conclusions, in THE JUDGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
2

169, 170 (Council ofEur. Pub. 1998).
21 David Neiman, supra note 39, at 825 n.193 (citing FELSENFELD, supranote 8, at 1 27).
212 For a comparison with the EU Regulation, see the discussion of the Eurofood and Daisytek
cases in Bufford, Global Venue Controls, supra note 11, at 126 131. See also Eurofood, 2006 E.C.R. 13813 (in a victory for a territorialist interpretation of COMI, holding that the COMI of a subsidiary
registered in a different country than the parent can only be rebutted by objective and ascertainable facts,
and the mere fact that the parent can control the subsidiaries' economic choices is not enough to rebut the
Regulation's presumption of the place of residence as the COMI).
213 NANCY C. DREHER & JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 3:18 (5th ed. 2003).

211 In re Artimm, 278 B.R. 832, 839 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that a trustee involved in an
Italian bankruptcy proceeding qualified as foreign representative).
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[was] to assist a foreign court in its administration of a foreign proceeding of
liquidation or reorganization., 215 A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding "serve[d]
as a jurisdictional aid for a foreign representative to facilitate the administration of a
bankruptcy or similar proceeding pending abroad. It allow[ed] a foreign
representative to marshal U.S. assets and eventually repatriate them, to obtain
discovery and to otherwise protect and facilitate the administration of the foreign
proceeding.216 However, 304 cases were not limited only to foreign proceedings
that concerned assets within the United States.21 Courts could utilize the broad
scope of 304 to obtain jurisdiction over ancillary proceedings where the debtor did
not have assets within the United States.218
1.

Process

Section 304(b)(3) allowed a bankruptcy court to "order ... appropriate relief'
and thus gave bankruptcy judges tremendous authority over the equities of
insolvency cases.219 Judges were to "be guided by what w[ould] best assure an
economical and expeditious administration of the estate. 220 In determining what
relief, if any, was appropriate, the court had to weigh six factors:221 1) 'just treatment
of all holders of claims against or interests in such [bankrupt] estate;" 2) "protection
of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the
processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;" 3) "prevention of preferential or
fraudulent dispositions of property of such [bankrupt] estate;" 4) "distribution of
proceeds of such [bankrupt] estate substantially in accordance with the order
prescribed by this title [11];" 5) "comity;" and 6) "if appropriate, the provision of an
opportunity222 for a fresh start for the individual that such foreign proceeding
concerns."
The goal of section 304(c)(1) was to ensure the fair distribution of assets among
all creditors of a debtor.223 In the context of whether a domestic creditor was being
treated fairly in a foreign jurisdiction, the 304(c)(1) requirement was met when the
applicable provisions of foreign law provided "a comprehensive procedure for the
orderly and equitable distribution of ...assets among all its creditors., 224 Similarly,
when applying the criteria of 304(c)(2), courts would examine, inter alia: 1) whether
215Id. at 836.
2" 2 ALAN N.

2004).

RESNICK

&

HENRY

J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,

304.03[1] (15th ed.

217Id. 304.02[5].
211See Haarhuis v. Kunnan Enters., Ltd., 177 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
211 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 304(b)(3), 304(c)(1)-(6) (2000), Pub. L. 95 598, 92 Stat. 2560 (1978)
(repealed 2005).
221In re Evans, 177 B.R. 193, 197 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting S. Rep. No. 95 989, at 35
(1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821 and H. Rep. No. 95 595, at 324 25 (1977), as
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281).
221 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1)-(6) (2000), Pub. L. 95 598, 92 Stat. 2560 (1978) (repealed 2005).
222Id.; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (defining comity as the "recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws").
223Anne Norby Nielsen, Comment, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Has ItFostered the
Development of an "InternationalBankruptcy System? ",22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 541,554 (1984).
221In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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adequate notice of the foreign proceeding is required; 2) the time limits within which
a creditor must file a claim; and 3) whether a creditor whose claim is rejected may
appeal the decision to a foreign court.225
226
The voiding of transfers by a foreign jurisdiction satisfied section 304(c)(3).
The requirements of "section 304(c)(4), which direct[ed] th[e] court to consider
whether the distribution of proceeds of the estate [would] be substantially in
accordance with that of the [U.S.] Bankruptcy Code," were met when the law of a
foreign jurisdiction was "generally in harmony with the Code,, 22 1 i.e., "not
repugnant to the American laws and policies. 228
Section 304(c)(5) required the consideration of comity, which had been
considered the most important of so-called 304(c) factors. 229 Comity was defined as
a doctrine that encouraged deference to foreign laws if certain factors in bankruptcy
were present.230 Recognizing this importance, under section 304, many courts
emphasized "deference to foreign insolvency proceedings 231
[to] facilitate 'equitable,
orderly, and systematic' distribution of [a] debtor's assets.
2.

Why It Didn't Work

Section 304(c), however, was plagued with internal inconsistencies that
undermined its purpose of "foster[ing] cooperation among countries by encouraging
a United States court to forbear its jurisdiction over the property [of a bankrupt
estate] in favor of allowing one foreign nation to administer the bankruptcy
proceeding. 232 Not surprisingly, without a clear expectation of international judicial
cooperation, 304(c)(2) and 304(c)(4) were often used to favor the interests of
American creditors over those interests of foreign creditors and a foreign debtor.233
Furthermore, U.S. courts "acted inconsistently in their decisions of 234
whether to grant
relief ...to foreign representatives and what type of relief to grant.,

225

id.

221, Section 304(c)(3) was satisfied when the law of a foreign jurisdiction voided fraudulent

transfers.
227 Farley, supranote 12, at 189.

221 Universal Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gee (In re Gee), 53 B.R. 891, 904 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)

(citing In re Culmer, 25 B.R. at 621). The Court commented that this element should not be read too
strictly. It would be a mistake to construe this provision to mean that a court must find effective
congruence between the distribution schemes of the United States and the country in which the foreign
proceeding is pending.
221 In re Blackwell, 270 B.R. 814, 828 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001); see also In re Bullmore, 300 B.R.

719, 732 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2003) ("Comity will be granted to the decision or judgment of a foreign court if
it is shown that the foreign court is a court of competent jurisdiction, and that the laws and public policy
of the forum state and the rights of its residents will not be violated." (quoting In re Gee, 53 B.R. at 901)).
231 Haarhuis,177 F.3d at 1013.
231 Societe Generale, 93 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773
F.2d 452, 458 (2d Cir. 1985)).
232 See Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, TransnationalBankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329, 340 (1993); Nielsen, supra note 223, at 554.
211 See Kraft & Aranson, supranote 232, at 341-43; Nielsen, supra note 223, at 554-56.
214 See Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism,supra note 23, at 796.
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U.S. courts granted comity to a number of foreign courts in the bankruptcy
setting. 235 However, in quite a few cases, courts denied the relief requested by
foreign representatives.236 In particular circumstances, the denial of relief prevented
the unfair treatment of U.S. creditors in foreign proceedings. 23 This fails to explain,
however, why U.S. courts failed to grant comity to foreign proceedings conducted in
the same countries in which the U.S. courts had granted comity in the past, including
Canada and Australia.238
This lack of consistency allowed bankruptcy courts to apply 304 in a fashion
that cut both ways, giving bankruptcy courts broad discretion "to mold appropriate
relief in near 'blank-check' fashion., 239 However, such judicial discretion often
favored the interests of American creditors over those interests of foreign creditors
and foreign debtors.240
B.
1.

The New Chapter 15

Scope

Section 304 was a unilateral creation of the U.S. and did not have the
advantages of the Model Law, with its international nature and its potential to
harmonize the treatment of cross-border insolvency. Chapter 15 notes its universal
foundations in section 1508: "In interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its
international origin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is
consistent
with
the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign
• 1.• ..
,,241

jurisdictions .

4

By replacing former section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, Cases Ancillary to
Foreign Proceedings, with Model Law-based chapter 15, Ancillary and Other
Cross-border Cases, title VIII of the 2005 Act encourages cooperation between the
U.S. and foreign countries with respect to transnational insolvency cases. Title VIII
also amends other sections of the Bankruptcy Code and of title 28 of the U.S. Code
(Judiciaryand JudicialProcedures)to fully implement chapter 15.
Chapter 15 is more pervasive than section 304 and, with its accompanying
amendments, modifies the venue rules for ancillary cases, provides outbound
authority for representatives of U.S. bankruptcy cases to seek relief from foreign
courts, addresses the management of simultaneous foreign and domestic proceedings

235 RESNICK& SOMMER, supra note 216, 304.08[5][b].
23I,
Id. (citing, among others, In re Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A., 13 B.R. 779, 779 80 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1981) (utilizing U.S. court to set several conditions favorable to U.S. creditors)).
237Id. (citing, among others, In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (U.S.
court denied petition of foreign bankruptcy trustee on grounds that U.S. creditor would lose secured
creditor status in foreign proceeding) and In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (U.S. court
would not defer to foreign proceeding wherein the special procedures for liquidation lacked minimal
protections to assure fair treatment of all creditors)).
23' RESNICK& SOMMER, supra note 216, 304.08[5][b].
231 Haarhuis, 177 F.3d at 1012 (quoting 3 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 304.07 (1998)).
210 See Kraft & Aranson, supranote 232, at 340-41; Nielsen, supra note 223, at 554.
211 II U.S.C.A. § 1508 (2005).
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involving the same debtor, and assures fair notice and treatment of foreign creditors
of U.S. debtors.242
2.

Venue Choices Under Chapter 15

Unlike section 304, chapter 15 narrows venue choices and requires that a
petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding be granted under chapter 15 before a
foreign representative can obtain relief in a U.S. court. 2 43 The recognition procedure
of section 1515 is the sole entry point for access by a foreign representative to the
state and federal court systems in the U.S. 244 (except for the limited purpose of
collecting the debtor's accounts receivable). Venue for recognition under chapter 15
is also narrowed to the single entry point where the debtor has its COMI. If
recognition is denied, the foreign representative cannot attempt to proceed in another
court.245 After recognition has been granted, the foreign representative, armed with a
certified copy of the order granting recognition, can seek relief in another court if
necessary.
3.

Procedure and Relief

As noted above, the foreign representative commences a case by filing a petition
for recognition of a foreign proceeding directly with the bankruptcy court.246 The
petition must be accompanied by documents evidencing the foreign proceeding and
the appointment and authority of the foreign representative. 24' Designed to make the
process efficient, the statute requires that the petition be decided at the earliest
possible time and allows several facilitating presumptions.248 The accompanying
documents are presumed to be authentic both as to the form and substance of
establishing the qualification of the foreign proceeding and representative.249 In
addition, for the purposes of determining whether the foreign proceeding is main or
non-main, the debtor's registered office is presumed to be the center of its main
interests.250
The foreign representative may commence a case by filing a petition for
"recognition of a foreign proceeding" directly with the bankruptcy court.251 If the
court grants recognition, and subject to whatever limitations the court may impose,
(1) the foreign representative (a) has the capacity to sue and be sued in a U.S. court
and (b) may apply directly to a U.S. court for appropriate relief in that court; and (2)
the U.S. court shall grant comity or cooperation to the foreign representative.252
242 Daniel Glosband, Chapter 15: U.S. Insolvency Reform Explained, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 1, 1 3
(2005), available at htp://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/FindaPublication.aspx
(search for

Daniel Glosband; then follow hyperlink for article in results) (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
243
244
245
241
247
241
241

See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1504 (2005).
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1515 (2005).
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1509(d) (2005).
11 U.S.C.A. § 1515 (2005).

id.
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1516, 1517(c) (2005).
11 U.S.C.A. § 1516.

250 ld.
251 11 U.S.C.A. § 1509(a) (2005).
252 11 U.S.C.A. § 1509(b) (2005).
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Upon recognition, the foreign representative (1) may commence an involuntary
case under section 303 or, under certain circumstances, a voluntary case under
section 301 or 302;253 (2) may participate as a party in interest in a case regarding the
debtor under the other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code; 25 4 or (3) may intervene in
any proceeding
in a state or federal court in the United States to which the debtor is a
255
party.
Under chapter 15, foreign creditors have the same rights with respect to the
commencement of or participation in a case under the Bankruptcy Code as afforded
to U.S. creditors, and claims of a foreign creditor may not be given lower priority
than those of other general unsecured claims solely because such claims are held by
a foreign creditor. 256 Further, whenever notice is to be given to creditors in a case
under the Bankruptcy Code, it must also be provided to creditors with foreign
addresses, and the court may order appropriate steps to notify foreign creditors
whose addresses are unknown.25 Such notification must be given individually,
unless the court finds that, under the circumstances, some other form of notification
is more appropriate.258 When the notice of the commencement of a case under the
Bankruptcy Code is given to foreign creditors, the notice must 1) indicate the time
and place for filing proofs of claim; 2) indicate whether secured creditors have filed
proofs of claim; and 3) contain any other information generally required to be
included. 259 Any rules or orders issued by the bankruptcy court with respect to notice
or the filing of proofs of claim shall provide additional time to creditors with foreign
addresses as is reasonable under the circumstances.260
4.

Recognition of Foreign Proceeding and Relief

A case under chapter 15 begins with the filing of a petition for recognition 261 of
a foreign proceeding in which the foreign representative has been appointed.262 The
petition for recognition must be accompanied by an English translation of either a
certified copy of the decision by the foreign court commencing the foreign
proceeding and appointing the representative or a certificate from that foreign court
affirming that such proceeding is pending and the representative has been
appointed. 263 After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court must enter the order of
recognition as long as (i) the foreign proceeding for which recognition is sought is
the foreign main or foreign non-main proceeding, (ii) the foreign representative is a
253 11 U.S.C.A. § 1511 (2005).

254 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (2005). While the statutory language is not clear, it is a reasonable
assumption that because the foreign representative has the authority to commence a case under section
301, 302, or 303, this section must refer to cases pending at the time of recognition.
255 11 U.S.C.A. § 1524 (2005).

251 11 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (a), (b) (2005). Section 1513 also specifically provides that it does not
change or codify present law as to the priority of claims under § 507 or § 726.
257 11 U.S.C.A. § 1514(a) (2005).
251 11 U.S.C.A. § 1514(b) (2005).

251 11 U.S.C.A. § 1514(c)(1)-(3)(2005).
211111 U.S.C.A. § 1514(d) (2005).

211 11 U.S.C.A. § 1502(7) (2005) defines recognition as the "entry of an order granting recognition
ofa foreign ... proceeding under this chapter."
212 See II U.S.C.A. § 1515 (2005); see also II U.S.C.A. § 1504 (2005).

213 11 U.S.C.A. § 1515(b), (d) (2005).
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"person or body," and (iii) the petition is accompanied by the appropriate supporting
documentation described above.264 Under chapter 15 the foreign representative need
not satisfy requirements, such as those found under section 304(c), before relief may
be granted. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court may refuse to take any action under
chapter 15 if the action would be "manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
United States. 265
Similarly to a section 304 proceeding, a case under chapter 15 may be
commenced in the district court for the district (1) in which the debtor has its
principal place of business or principal assets in the United States; or, (2) if there are
no assets or place of business in the United States, in the district in which there is a
pending action against the debtor.266 Unlike section 304, however, even when there
are no assets, place of business, or pending litigation, a chapter 15 case may still be
commenced in a district "in which venue will be consistent with the interests of
justice and convenience
of the parties, having regard to the relief sought by the
' 7
foreign representative. ,26
5.

Substantive Relief

Under section 304 the court may grant interim relief for the period between the
filing of the petition for recognition and the granting of the petition by the court if
relief is urgently needed to protect the assets or interests of the debtor and/or the
interests of creditors. This interim relief may include (1) staying any execution
against the debtor's assets; (2) entrusting the administration or realization of the
debtor's assets located in the United States to the foreign representative or another
person authorized by the court; (3) suspending the right to transfer, encumber, or
otherwise dispose of any assets of the debtor; (4) granting discovery concerning the
debtor's assets or affairs; or (5) granting any additional relief that may be available
to a trustee (with certain limitations).268 Such interim relief may be denied if it
interferes with the foreign main proceeding. 269 The granting of interim relief is
governed by the standards and limitations generally applicable to preliminary
injunctions.2 70 In addition, unless otherwise extended, interim relief terminates when
the petition for recognition is granted.2 71
In probably the most significant departure from section 304, chapter 15 provides
that upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the automatic stay under section 362
applies with respect to the debtor and the property of the debtor within the territorial

214 11 U.S.C.A. § 1517 (2005).

215 11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (2005). Although the granting of recognition does not require the
bankruptcy court to consider comity, this provision gives the court the right to deny relief under chapter
15 if the court believes comity should not be granted based on public policy.
211 See 28 U.S.C. § 1410(1)-(2) (2000).
217

28 U.S.C. § 1410(3) (2000).

211 11 U.S.C.A. § 1519(a) (2005). Avoiding powers are not available in ancillary proceedings. See
In re Petition of Kolima, 177 B.R. 696, 703 n.35 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (applying the rule to section
304). Additionally, the court may not enloin a police or regulatory act of government, including a criminal
action or proceeding. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1519(d) (2005).
211 1I U.S.C.A.§ 1519(c)(2005).
210 1U.S.C.A.§ 1519(e)(2005).
211 11 U.S.C.A. § 1519(b)(2005).

2008]

COORDINATING CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY

jurisdiction of the United States.2 72 Although injunctive relief previously available
under section 304 may be similar to the automatic stay under section 362, chapter 15
effectively eliminates the need for the foreign representative to satisfy any nonbankruptcy standards (to the extent applicable) for injunctive relief or any of the
gate-keeper standards of section 304(c) before such relief can be granted.2
A grant of any relief under 304 was discretionary with the court and conditioned
on satisfaction of the so-called section 304(c) factors. Under section 304 no relief
was granted without court approval based on satisfaction of the statutory list of
criteria. In contrast, recognition of a foreign main proceeding (under section 1517)-the expedited validation that the foreign proceeding and the foreign representative
satisfy the definitional requirements-imposes automatic effects, including an
automatic stay of actions against the debtor and its assets and an automatic
grant of
274
authority to the foreign representative to operate the debtor's business.
275
Chapter 15 also provides that, upon recognition of a foreign main or non-main
proceeding, if the court finds that it is necessary to effectuate the purpose of chapter
15 and to protect the debtor's assets and the interests of creditors, the court may
grant "appropriate" relief (supplemental relief) including: 1) staying the
commencement or continuation of any action or proceeding concerning the debtor's
assets, rights, obligations, or liabilities (to the extent not already stayed under section
362); 2) staying execution against the debtor's assets (to the extent not already
stayed under section 362); 3) suspending the right to transfer, encumber, or
otherwise dispose of any assets (to the extent not already stayed under section 362);
and 4) extending the interim relief.276 In addition, the court may a) grant discovery
concerning the debtors assets, affairs, rights, obligations, or liabilities; b) entrust the
administration or realization of the debtor's assets located in the United States to the
foreign representative or another person authorized by the court; and c) grant any
additional relief that may be available to a trustee (with certain limitations).

Similar to section 304 in its granting of the ability to request turnover, chapter
15 authorizes the court to entrust the distribution of the debtor's assets located in the
United States to the foreign representative (or some other person authorized by the
court), provided that the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors in the United
States are sufficiently protected. 27' The court may condition the granting of
supplemental relief (as well as interim relief) to whatever conditions it deems

272 11 U.S.C.A. § 1520(a) (2005).
273 See, e.g., Schimmelpenninck v. Byrne (In re Schimmelpenninckj, 183 F.3d 347, 366 (5th Cir.

1999) (holding that declaratory and iniunctive relief sought through proceedings that are ancillary to a
foreign bankruptcy in a country whose laws are compatible with those of the United States should be
analyzed under section 304, not section 362, of the Bankruptcy Code).
274 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1520 (2005).
275 If it is a foreign non-main proceeding, the court must be satisfied that the relief relates to assets
that, under the laws of the United States, should be administered in the foreign non-main proceeding or
concerns information required in that proceeding. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1521(c) (2005).
271 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1521(1)-(3),(6) (2005).
211 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1521(4), (5), (7) (2005).
211 11

U.S.C.A. § 1521(b)(2005).
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appropriate, including, but not limited to, the giving of security or the posting of a
bond.2 79
6.

Cooperation with Foreign Courts

Consistent with the goal of cross-border cooperation, the court is required to
cooperate, to the extent possible, with a foreign court or a foreign representative and
is entitled to communicate directly with, or request information from, a foreign court
or foreign representative, subject to the rights of parties in interest to notice and
participation.
7.

Concurrent Proceedings

Once a foreign main proceeding has been recognized under chapter 15, the
foreign representative may commence a case under one of the other chapters of the
Bankruptcy Code only if the debtor has assets in the United States.2 1 If a bankruptcy
case is commenced, the case will affect only assets of the debtor within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States and extend to other assets of the debtor to the extent
necessary to allow cooperation and coordination between the bankruptcy court and
the foreign court.2 8 2 If the case under one of the other chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code is already pending at the time the petition for recognition is filed, (1) any
interim or supplemental relief granted in the chapter 15 case must be consistent with
the relief granted in the bankruptcy case; and (2) the provisions of section 1520
(making sections 362, 363, 549, and 552 applicable to chapter 15 cases) will not
apply even if the foreign proceeding is recognized.283 If a bankruptcy case is
commenced after the recognition of the foreign proceeding, any interim or
supplemental relief (and, if the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding, any
relief granted under section 1520) is subject to modification or termination if such
relief is inconsistent with the relief granted in the bankruptcy case. 4
Under section 304, the U.S. had a provision in the bankruptcy code that
addressed the issue of cross-border insolvency, provided a structure for cooperation
and coordination, and gave courts wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief.
However, this wide discretion meant that section 304 was applied inconsistently thus
vitiating any predictability territorialistic rules provided. Chapter 15 begins with the
instruction to U.S. bankruptcy judges that cooperation and coordination are the rule
and not the exception and then provides a structure within which judges can operate.
Multinational concerns and their creditors can now predict the actions of a U.S.
bankruptcy court and plan accordingly. This universalist mandate is tempered by
sections 1506, 1515, 1516, and others whereby U.S. bankruptcy judges still retain a
wide amount of control over the administration of domestic assets and creditors'

271 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1522(b) (2005).
211 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1525 (2005).

§ 1528 (2005).
212 See id.
213 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1529(1) (2005).
214 See II U.S.C.A. § 1529(2) (2005) (A court can also order dismissal or suspension of
proceedings after recognition of a foreign proceeding if the purposes of chapter 15 "would best be served
by such dismissal or suspension.") II U.S.C.A. § 305(a) (as amended), II U.S.C.A. § 1529(4) (2005).
211 11 U.S.C.A.
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rights. It is, in fact, these territorialistic provisions that will enable domestic judges
to feel comfortable cooperating and coordinating with foreign proceedings. It is also
these territorialistic provisions that will encourage domestic creditors to invest in
foreign concerns and foreign creditors to invest in U.S. concerns.
VIII.

INTERNATIONAL VENUE SHOPPING

A significant problem of insolvencies of international entities is the opportunity
to venue shop with its attendant potential to create far more harms than domestic
forum shopping. With multinational entities having a presence in a variety of
domestic legal systems, many of which use a simple place of establishment
(territorialist) standard, entities can choose which domestic law they would like to
have applied to all or part of an insolvency process. While this choice allows
companies to maximize benefits they receive from bankruptcy proceedings, such an
unfettered system may be of significant detriment to domestic creditors, and it
allows multinational entities with economic characteristics similar to domestic
entities to receive vastly different treatment. Furthermore, it contributes to a "race to
the bottom" wherein a multinational entity can file bankruptcy in a country where it
has few creditors. 2 5 Here again, an international insolvency regime with elements of
both territorialism and universalism provides an imperfect, but most effective,
solution to issues created by the differences of domestic laws.
Under a territorialist system, whereby jurisdiction is determined by corporate
residence only, forum shopping is easy because an entity can forum shop simply by
moving assets of a single company to another forum. Other domestic laws may limit
such actions, but these domestic laws are of no comfort to the secured domestic
creditor who now finds his security interest in a foreign country that lacks the
domestic legal machinery sufficient to afford him any significant relief. In a pure
universalist system, on the other hand, the elimination of a local court's discretion to
deny the enforcement of a foreign bankruptcy order provides a similar incentive to
forum shop among those courts that are most favorable to the debtor's interests.28 6
An unregulated universalism has lead to courts' deciding to keep cases that should
be sent to the courts of another country.28
Modified universalism partially solves this problem by creating a hybrid set of
rules designed to balance certainty of application with legal expectations of
cooperation. The Model Law looks at the debtor's COMI, but it presumes that a
multinational concern's COMI is its place of registration. Professor LoPucki claims
that these standards are highly subjective. 28 While the application of each of these
concepts depends on the facts of each particular case, both case law and
commentaries have developed a host of guides for their application. European

215 See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 31, at 4 5, (explaining that contractualist theorists
believe that allowing multinationals to choose their place of bankruptcy is the most preferable option).
211 See LoPucki, Global and Out of Control,supra note 42, at 209-10.
211 Id. at 223-24.
21 See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supranote 94, at 153-54.
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countries have used the standard in their tax systems for years, and European courts
are well versed in the analysis even in the context of bankruptcy.28 9
IX. ADDRESSING THE DEFECTS OF THE MODEL LAW
Despite its incorporation of the advantages of both territorialism and
universalism, the modified universalism of the Model Law has some serious
procedural deficiencies with major substantive effects. Critics and supporters alike
have noted two areas of weakness in the Model Law that require correction: the
separation of the decision to open an insolvency case from the determination of
when an insolvency case is the main case, and the problem of corporate groups.
A.

Timing of the Decision on Whether a Case is the Main Case

The conflict of the individual decision to open a bankruptcy case and the
decision to recognize a foreign bankruptcy proceeding as a main proceeding only
arises in a universalist system, where these decisions usually are made on the same
day. 290 Under a territorialist regime a foreign case has no status or recognition, and
problems of international coordination are left to treaties and private initiative to
solve.291
As was seen in the Eurofood case, the decision whether a case is a main case is
too important an issue in a transnational insolvency case to decide at the outset
before all of the parties in interest have been provided notice and given an
opportunity to be heard.292 The recognition of a main case is essentially a choice of
forum and a determination of the law that will govern the rights and obligations of
parties in the case.
The Model Law fails to provide a procedure to assure notice to the interested
parties and an opportunity to be heard before the decision on this issue is made. The
Model Law focuses on the recognition of foreign cases and the treatment of domestic
cases thereafter in the recognizing state. However, the Model Law also does not
provide a procedure for recognizing a foreign case as a main case; nor does it
provide a procedure for determining whether a domestic case is a main case.29 3 Judge
Bufford recommends that UNCITRAL propose procedures that Model-Law
countries could adopt to assure that a decision recognizing a foreign case as a main
case, or determining that a domestic case is a main case, is made only after the due
process rights of the parties in interest have been respected. 294 A UNCITRAL-guided

211 See, e.g., Eurofood, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813 (holding also that the evidence presented did not

overcome the presumption in the EU Regulation that the debtor's COMI is its place of registration).
211 See Bufford, Global Venue Controls,supra note 11, at 132.
211 See LoPucki, Global and Out of Control,supra note 42, at 225 26 (arguing that in a territorial
system countries would find it in their common interests to enter into treaties requiring the return of assets
fleeing imminent bankruptcy cases).
212 See Lucio Ghia, The Italian Legislation Providedfor the ParinalatCase Under a Critic'sPoint
of

Vieiw,

available
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COORDINATING CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY

2008]

resolution will maintain the domestic court's decision-making primacy; however,
procedural rules crafted for the Model Law will provide that the international
framework has a base expectation of due process and fairness.
B.

CorporateGroups

Modified universalist regimes such as the Model Law and the EU Regulation
currently require the treatment of each legal entity separately for the purpose of
determining the location of its COMI, which in turn determines the proper location
of its main insolvency case. Such a structure, while having the territorialist
advantages of predictability, creates vast economic inefficiencies when multiple
courts administer what are essentially multiple main cases. A legal framework that
allows for the reorganization or liquidation of an entire economic unit will be more
efficient than one that deals with its corporate parts separately.
Virtually all multinational corporate empires are corporate groups, not single
corporations, and indeed there are often hundreds of legally separate entities.295 Such
corporate arrangements run the gamut from independent subsidiaries to branch
operations.296 In order to balance the competing demands of domestic courts and an
international legal system, the most efficient approach seems to be to administer
economically integrated group members in the home country of the integrated group,
and to administer economically independent group members separately in their own
home countries. 29
Given the fact that most multinational corporate entities contain multiple groups
of companies, it is surprising that the Model Law and EU Regulation have not
provided for insolvency proceedings that address the corporate group as a whole.
The assumptions of each are that the court will evaluate each legal entity based on its
COMI to determine the proper venue and that that COMI should correspond with
where each entity "conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and
is therefore ascertainable by third parties., 29 The main factors one is supposed to
look at in determining the COMI of a multinational concern are transparency and
objective ascertainability. 299 Thus, those who deal with a debtor are assumed to
found their expectations on the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from systematic
conduct and arrangements, and it ought not to be possible for the debtor to gain
advantages, at creditor's expense, by using evasive or confusing techniques to hide
the true location from which interests are systematically administered.300 The default
COMI is decidedly territorialist: the place of incorporation is the individual
company's presumed COM. 30 1
However, this approach does not address all issues because "a corporate group
that is an integrated economic unit can only be reorganized or liquidated efficiently

215 See LoPucki, Global and Out of Control,supra note 42, at 221.
296
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if it is done collectively for the entire group. 30 2 Here is one area where the
territorialist-based systems need to cede some ground to a more universalist
approach. "The universalist solution is to modify the COMI definition to provide
that the corporate group venue decision be based on the collective COMI of all of the
legal entities that operate together as an integrated economic unit."30 3 Thus, the
critical question under a universalist approach would be the degree of economic
integration of an economic group: where there is economic integration, the COMI of
the corporate group will displace the COMIs of individual entities, but where there is
no economic integration the court will decide the COMI of each individual economic
unit.30 4 This approach places a higher burden on creditors and judges, but the end
result of a more economically efficient insolvency proceeding justifies the burden.
Creditors will be forced to make a reasonable inquiry into current, functional
realities of the debtor's corporate administration. Judges will need specialized
training in corporate and financial structures. However, the time and administration
costs to judges and creditors will be far outweighed by the efficiencies created by a
single bankruptcy structure. Furthermore, domestic business will gain because
foreign participants in economic activities within a given member state will be
subject to equal rules and conditions.30 5
Unquestionably, it is much harder to manipulate the COMI of a corporate group
than it is to manipulate the COMI of a particular corporation.30 6 Any attempt at
manipulation involving assets diversion or the use of affiliates to manipulate the
group's financial resources can be ameliorated through a pooling mechanism,
especially if remote affiliates are included.30 7
The determination of a COMI for a group of multinational entities will require a
more sophisticated judiciary and a more complex economic analysis. However,
bankruptcy courts are used to such challenges, and a legislature that requires such
determinations in the interest of greater economic efficiency should be willing to
provide the resources that judges need to acquire such sophistication. Here, as
elsewhere in the consideration of a better multinational insolvency regime, shortterm administrative costs are outweighed by long-terms gains to the international
economic system as a whole.
C. Residency Rule
The problem of international venue-shopping still exists under the Model Law
and chapter 15. A multinational enterprise's COMI is presumed to be its place of
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303 Id.
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306See Guzman, Defense of Universalism,supra note 17, at 2214.
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registration or incorporation, and thus suffers from the same territorialist defects, i.e.,
the ease with which an enterprise can change its official residency for purposes of
filing bankruptcy in a more favorable venue. A partial solution to the problem would
be to require a "residency rule" like that required in countries seeking to mollify the
effects of their territorialist systems, which would require that an international
business enterprise have its COMI in a country for a minimum period of time before
qualifying to file a domestic enterprise-wide bankruptcy case.308 While this rule
change would not prohibit venue shopping, it would make such shopping more
difficult.
Under the current version of the Model Law, a court recognizing a foreign
proceeding decides whether the foreign proceeding is a main proceeding.30 9 For the
recognition of a foreign main proceeding, the Model Law requires that the foreign
proceeding be held where the debtor "has the centre of its main interests" and
implicitly gives courts flexibility as to when they make this determination.310 A
residency rule requiring a specified minimum amount of time for corporate residency
before the filing of bankruptcy in the jurisdiction would give judges the power to
look beyond COMI when the debtor has not met the minimum threshold.
Such a residency rule is similar to the approach that the United States takes
today. Proper venue for a case in the United States is the district where venue was
proper for the 180 days immediately preceding the filing of the case.311 If the district
where venue would be proper has changed during the 180-day period, the proper
venue is the district that has qualified as the proper venue for a longer period of time
during the 180-day window than any other.3 12 Under a similar rule, a debtor would
typically qualify for opening a main case only in a country where its COMI has been
located for more than six months before its filing.313
X. CONCLUSION
Remedying the problems in international bankruptcy is no easy task. The
analytical framework for evaluating transnational insolvency is described by
territorialism and universalism. Territorialism allows the bankruptcy court of a
particular jurisdiction to apply its laws to the benefit of its jurisdictional creditors
and gives a great deal of certainty, not only to creditors but also to corporate groups
that rely on these laws.3 14 This has the potential to be unfair to a number of parties in
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any international proceeding. Universalism, on the other hand, requires all involved
jurisdictions to relinquish their sovereignty and apply the law of a foreign
jurisdiction. This has many associated efficiencies; however, many courts are
reluctant to do this, especially because bankruptcy law overrides almost all other
forms of law. However, without universalism, creditors have distorted incentives
when choosing between reorganization and liquidation because their decisions are
made not based on economic principles but based on arbitrage inherent in a world of
multiple legal systems.
The complex task of an insolvency grows even more complicated with the
presence of international actors. Domestic judges often do not have the legal skills or
the legal framework with which to approach a multinational bankruptcy. Chapter 15
gives U.S. bankruptcy judges a comprehensive legal framework with which to
approach a bankruptcy process subject to multiple legal jurisdictions. The Code
provides clear instructions on the circumstances in which a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding should be recognized and clear expectations and guidelines regarding
cooperation. In other words, where, by law or public policy, U.S. bankruptcy courts
need to administer all or parts of an insolvency case, their judges can retain comfort
in the familiarity of U.S. law, while at the same time receiving instruction on the
coordination with foreign bankruptcy proceedings. While U.S. bankruptcy judges
still need training in international aspects of bankruptcy, they at least have a
foundation on which to base decisions.
Chapter 15 and the Model Law are not perfect, however. The most pressing
unresolved question is the bankruptcy proceedings of the multiple entities of a
multinational concern. While domestically the U.S. has much experience in
consolidation of bankruptcy proceedings,3 15 consolidation on an international scale
has been of limited applicability.316 In the past, successful consolidations of
multinational concerns were conducted without the need to centralize the process to
a single place by relying mainly on cooperation.31 Yet these occasions were most
notably a matter of parties' good will and courts' cooperation. Moreover, it may be
difficult to achieve such cooperation when numerous parties are involved.318 Given
the initial complexity of an international bankruptcy proceeding and the added
variables of the application of the laws of numerous countries, the ad hoc or bilateral
treaty approach of cooperative territorialists is insufficient to address the interests of
a multitude of actors whose interests in the bankruptcy proceeding may not be
apparent at the initial stages when the ad hoc approach is cemented or addressed by a
bilateral treaty.319 In furtherance of modified universalist principles, an overall
315 See PHILIP J. BLUMBERG, PROBLEMS IN THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT

AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES 402 405 (1985).
311, Jacob S. Ziegel, Corporate Groups and Cross-border Insolvencies: A Canada-UnitedStates
Perspective, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 376 (2002) (explaining that procedural consolidation "is

almost de rigueur" in Canada and U.S. corporate groups' reorganizations).
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estate facilitating a worldwide coordinated and harmonized solution.).
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311See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 26, at 2314-15 (stating that territorialism is less
able to cope with the problems of international business because of its dependence on a model that is
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multinational procedural approach provides the flexibility needed when faced with
the potential for numerous international actors and also allows for the administration
of bankruptcy assets according to a territorialist system. Such an approach can
further contribute to effective enterprise recovery if it will enforce rules of
international jurisdiction and applicable law, thus enabling a unitary process with
universal effects for the multinational concern with a single court that leads the
entire process.320 While chapter 15 is a huge step for the United States into
international cooperation, current trends indicate that its main trading partners are
adopting similar modified universalist provisions in their bankruptcy codes and that
its domestic businesses and creditors will only be advantaged by the new approach.
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